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SECURITY AT SEA: A REVIEW OF THE PREFERRED
SHIP MORTGAGEt
RICHARD GYORY*
IN JU TE 1920, Congress climaxed a burst of legislative activity directed
to the Merchant Marine by passing the Ship Mortgage Act.' Its
purpose was to furnish realistic financing for the maritime field, and to
help the Government dispose of three billion dollars' worth of tonnage
acquired during World War I.2
Entering its fifth decade, the preferred ship mortgage is the subject
of extensive economic activity on the part of the Government and pri-
vate investors.3 At the same time, the preferred ship mortgage is under-
going the most intense litigational period in its history." This litigation
I The author wishes to acknowledge the helpful suggestions of Martin Gold, Esq. and
Lloyd Reed, Esq. of the New York Bar.
* Member of the New York Bar.
1. Merchant Marine Act of 1920 § 30, 41 Stat. INOD, as amended, 46 US.C. § 911
(195s).
2. 58 Cong. Rec., pt. 8, 8153 (1919).
3. Figures are not available for recorded preferred ship mortgages, but the current gov-
ernment program of insurance furnishes a guide to one sector of this activity. See notes
166-72 infra and accompanying text. The Administrator announced that such inzurance
during the first half of 1961 had risen by $27 million, to a total of $46S million in com-
mitments with an additional $127 million pending. Maritime Administration Press Release,
No. 61-64, July 28, 1961.
4. There were nine reported opinions in 1961, and five in 1960 which dealt with pre-
ferred ship mortgages, or with aspects defining rights and remedies of such mortgages.
United States v. The Zarco, 187 F. Supp. 371, 1961 Am. Mar. Cas. 73 (S.D. Cal. 1960);
The Valiant Power, 193 F. Supp. 460, 1961 Am. Mar. Cas. 266 (El). Va. 1961);
Wall St. Traders, Inc. v. Wang, 1961 Am. Mar. Cas. 9S6 (Sup. CL), aff'd mem., 13 App.
Div. 2d 767, 217 N.Y.S.2d 501, 1961 Am. Mar. Cas. 2214 (1st Dep't 1961), related proceed-
ings, Barnouw v. The Ozark, 304 F.2d 717, 1962 Am. Mar. Cas. 1675 (5th Cir. 1962) (cert.
pending); Merchants & Marine Bank v. The T. E. Wells, 2S9 Fad 188, 1961 Am. Mar.
Cas. 1042 (5th Cir. 1961); The Seneca (St. Louis Shipbuilding & Steel Co. v. Fizt NatI
Bank & Trust Co.), 287 F.2d 366, 1961 Am. Mfar. Cas. 1617 (5th Cir. 1961) ; Meridian Trad-
ing Corp. v. The Kingston, 1961 Am. Mar. Cas. 1321 (S.D. Tex. 1961); The Irving Trust Co.
v. The Golden Sail, 197 F. Supp. 777 (D. Ore. 1961); Crabtree v. The Julia, 290 F.2d
478 (5th Cir. 1961); First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. The Seneca, 179 F. Supp.
847, 1960 Am. Mfar. Cas. 766 (ElD. La. 1960); First Safe Deposit Natl Bank v. The North
Star, 185 F. Supp. 815 (D. Mass. 1960); United States v. The Audrey II, 18S F. Supp. 777,
1960 Am. Mar. Cas. 1977 (ND. Cal. 1960); Meridian Trading Co. v. The Denton, 19-0 Am.
Mar. Cas. 2264 (S.D. Tea. 1960), aff'd sub nom. Brandon v. SS. Denton, 302 F2d 404,
1962 Am. far. Cas. 1730 (5th Cir. 1962); The Valiant Power (American Tramp Ship & D-
vel. Corp. v. Coal Export Corp.), 276 F.2d 570, 1960 Am. Mar. Cas. 2301 (4th Cir.
1960). Only three other years produced equal or greater numbers of reported opinions di-
rectly or tangentially dealing with the preferred ship mortgage: eleven in 1923, six in 1924,
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arises largely out of the wave of foreclosures commencing in 1960. In
view of this recent experience of defaults, the cautious investor may be
led to ask his counsel for an opinion as to the soundness of this somewhat
unfamiliar form of investment. The purpose of this article is to furnish
a guide to that opinion.
I. PREHISTORY
Prior to 1920, a "mortgage" on a ship was an indefinite right to ask
for whatever remained in court in a proceeding started by a "maritime
lienor," after all the maritime liens had been satisfied." The "mortgagee"
was not a maritime lienor. He could not initiate a proceeding against a
ship. His "right" in the property was little more than a personal claim
against the owner, with some possibility of collecting out of a fortuitous
surplus left after satisfying seamen's, repairmen's, suppliers' and pos-
sibly other claims.
The Supreme Court in 1854,0 relying largely on an English case, The
Neptune,7 held itself to be without jurisdiction over a ship mortgage
which, it said, was nonmaritime. Mr. Justice Wayne noted that the
British courts had been given jurisdiction8 after The Neptune, but that
eight in 1938. Generally, the earlier reports were more brief and limited both in the type of
problem, and in the consideration given.
5. The Lottawanna (Wilson v. Bell), 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 201 (1873) indicates some
hesitation as to the right of the mortgagee to proceeds in the absence of the owner's con-
sent. However, when the same matter came up again, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558 (1874), the
Court entertained no doubt on the point, citing Bogart v. The John Jay, 58 U.S. (17 How.)
399 (1854), which case did not pass upon the question, but rather suggested an ephemeral
remedy in equity. In The Angelique (Schuchardt v. Babbidge), 60 U.S. (19 How.) 239
(1856), The John Jay was cited to deny the foreclosure. The Court stated that by petition
the mortgagees could have applied against the fund resulting from other proceedings based on
maritime liens.
6. Bogart v. The John Jay, supra note 5. The narrowness of the Court's outlook In this
and subsequent ship mortgage cases contrasted sharply with its usual broad approach In
which it claimed a wide range for admiralty jurisdiction. See Stevens, Erie R.R. v. Thomp-
kins and the Uniform General Maritime Law, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 246 (1950).
7. 3 Hagg. Adm. Rep. 129, 132, 166 Eng. Rep. 354, 355 (P. 1834). The remarks relied
on were in the nature of dicta. The major issue was whether the materialman had a lien
and whether such lien transferred from ship to proceeds of sale. The rights of the mortgagee,
if any, were held subordinate to those of the owner-mortgagor. Thus if the materlnlman
had a lien, and the court so held, the mortgagee, whatever his rights, was subordinated to
the materialman. Curiously, the Supreme Court did not add that the decision they cited
was reversed in The Neptune (Hodges v. Sims), 3 Knapp 94, 12 Eng. Rep. 584 (P.C. 1835),
where the court held the materialman lost his lien by giving up possession. The materialman
was not even entitled as of right to the proceeds in court. The mortgagee was then given the
proceeds on the basis of possession of the ship when process was instituted.
8. Admiralty Court Act of 1840, 3 & 4 Vict., ch. 65. The British act was very limited
in its application; it apparently gave little more than a right to the proceeds in tha court.
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our courts would have to wait "until this shall be done in the United
States by Congress.... ." The Court did not mention the recording act"&
which permitted, and indeed, seemed to require, recording of the mort-
gage. Subsequently, however, the Court dismissed a reference to this
statute as a "mere registry act,"'" leaving the maritime industry with
the bare form of a mortgage law and a suggestion for later action.
That the Court's suggestion was not acted upon for sixty-six years must
be attributed to lack of pressure from the industry, itself. The decline
of the American Merchant Marine during the years following the Civil
War and prior to World War I suggests a flight of capital to different
ventures. By contrast, the other maritime nations of the world were
busily adding ship mortgage provisions to their laws.
The First World War drastically changed America's economic position
in the world and dramatically altered its shipping industry. With a sud-
den need for large ships in great numbers, the Government quickly became
the owner of a fleet of unparalleled size.12 With the end of the war, it
faced the next phase of the problem: What to do with all the ships, a
large part of which was now unnecessary? The climate of the time was
highly unfavorable to continued government ownership, and more so to
government operation." But even at reduced prices, there was no pros-
pect of cash sales." And beyond immediate disposal, the members of
Congress were conscious of the need to create the prospect of a long-
term structure of financing with the possibility of refinancing in order
to put the maritime industry on a par with other industries. 5 As one
judge colorfully phrased it:
Prior to the enactment of the Ship Mortgage Act ... ships were about as available
This had been granted without need of statute in America. See The Lottawanna, supra
note 5. There was, however, an extension of the British mortgagee's rights in the Admiralty
Court Act of 1S61, 24 & 25 Vict., ch. 10; see Price, The Lavw of Maritime iVens 9S-99
(1940).
9. The John Jay, supra note 5, at 402.
10. Ship Mortgage Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 100D, 46 U.S.C. § 921 (195S).
11. The J. E. Rumbell, 14S U.S. 1, 16 (1893). Conversely, a district judge paFsing upon
the constitutionality of the Ship Mortgage Act of 1920, in a case which was ultimately
to be sustained by the Supreme Court, held the act valid because it was merely a procedural
innovation. The Thomas Barum, 56 F.2d 455, 1932 Am. Mar. Cas. 931 (W.D..Y. 1932).
12. Congressman Bankhead reported the size as fourteen million tons. See note 2 zupma.
At the outbreak of World War I the United States had just over one million tons, which
doubled by the time we entered the war. See also 53 Cong. Rec. pt. 8, 3150, 3152 (1919).
The figure reached eight million in 1919. Total world merchant tonnage in 1919 was lsted
by Lloyds as approximately fifty-one million. Id. at 3146.
13. Id. at 3143-44, 3152-53, 8160; see also 59 Cong. Rec., pt. 7, 7225 (1920).
14. 53 Cong. Rec. pt. 3, 3157, 8161 (1919); see also 59 Cong. Rec., pt. 7, 722S (1920).
15. See 59 Cong. Rec., pt. 7, 7223-27 (1920); see also note 17 infma.
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for credit for general purposes as the snows of last December. 0 The object of that
statute was to enable the owners of vessels to use the vast capital invested in them
with at least a part of the facility enjoyed by investors in structures on land. 17
The act of 1920, designed to meet both the immediate ship disposal
problem of the Government and the long standing financial difficulties
of the industry, passed Congress with no substantial opposition and
little debate.
II. THE ACT IN BRIEF
The Ship Mortgage Act created a new type of security in that it per-
mitted "vessel[s] of the United States" to be effectively pledged by the
shipowner.18 The mortgagee no longer had to await the action of another
creditor, and then only receive whatever remained after the maritime
lienors had taken their share.
The legislators did not attempt a finely drawn description of the
substantive rights which were given to creditors. In many respects the
statute is less descriptive than the chattel mortgage developments which
were in progress at approximately the same time. 19 Much of the text
was devoted to procedural details.2" A large part of the statute con-
sisted of a re-enactment of the earlier recording provisions 21 and, with
some changes, of the Federal Maritime Lien Law of 1910.22 But in the
16. "Mais ou sont les neiges d'antan." Villon, Ballade.
17. The Owego, 292 Fed. 403, 405, 1923 Am. Mar. Cas. 1060, 1061 (E.D. La. 1923).
After a lapse of many years this purpose has been reiterated in a recent case, Merchants &
Marine Bank v. The T. E. Wells, 289 F.2d 188, 1961 Am. Mar. Cas. 1042 (5th Cir. 1961),
in which little or no reference was made to the attempt to achieve such parity; cf. The
Jane B. (United States v. Jane B. Corp.), 167 F. Supp. 352 (D. Mass. 1958), 73 Harv. L.
Rev. 423 (1959); The Fort Orange, 5 F. Supp. 833, 1934 Am. Mar. Cas. 240 (S.D.N.Y.
1933); The Thomas Barum, 56 F.2d 455, 1932 Am. Mar. Cas. 931 (W.D.N.Y. 1932);
The Northern No. 41, 297 Fed. 343, 1924 Am. Mar. Cas. 583 (S.D. Fla. 1924); The Nan-
king, 292 Fed. 642, 1923 Am. Mar. Cas. 1191 (ND. Cal. 1923).
18. Ship Mortgage Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 1000, as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 922 (1958)
(Supp. III, 1959-1961) as originally enacted specified such ships be over 200 tons. This was
revised in 1935 to include all vessels "of the United States" except various harbor craft.
49 Stat. 424 (1935), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 922 (1958) (Supp. III, 1959-1961). In 1961,
the limit for excepted harbor craft was reduced to twenty-five tons. 75 Stat. 661 (1961),
46 U.S.C. § 922 (Supp. III, 1959-1961). See also note 149 infra. Most merchant vessels
can now be mortgaged, but pleasure craft although they may be registered federally,
ordinarily are registered locally and, therefore, not subject to a preferred ship mortgage.
19. Cf. Uniform Chattel Mortgage Act, A.B.A. Conference 1926-1927, Nat'l Conference of
Comm'rs on Uniform State Laws (2d ed. 1927).
20. Ship Mortgage Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 1000, as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 922 (1958)
(Supp. III, 1959-1961). See also Gilmore & Black, Admiralty § 9-57, at 590 (1957).
21. 41 Stat. 1000 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 921 (1958).
22. 41 Stat. 1005 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 971-75 (1958).
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sections dealing with foreclosure - and priority24 significant changes were
accomplished.
The lender was permitted by the act to sue the ship in rem on the
admiralty side of the federal courts.2 A new personal right in admiralty
was also established. -0 Upon default, foreclosure of the lien was allowed
to the full extent of the outstanding debt. 7 The mortgagee's claim was
given priority over all but "preferred maritime liens," consisting of liens
prior in time and a few specified liens irrespective of time.2 In short,
the act purported to make a ship mortgage a "mortgage." It remained
to be seen what reception the law would be given in the courts. There
was doubt as to both its constitutionality and legal effect.
III. EA 1LY HISTORY
Despite several early chalenges to the constitutionality of the statute,
it was not until fourteen years had elapsed that the Supreme Court met
this issue.29 Considering the opportunities to test the law, as well as the
speed with which another portion of the same act reached the Court, it
is surprising that the decision was so long in coming."0 So far as the
Government was concerned, a major part of the objective of the act had
already been answered in 1934 when the law was held constitutional."1
The original government mortgages on ships disposed of by postwar
sales had in large part matured, and their sales price was substantially
23. 41 Stat. 1003 (1920), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 951 (1953). For further discu-sson.
of these pro,isions, see notes S3 & 132 infra and accompanying text.
24. 41 Stat. 1004 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 953 (1953).
25. 41 Stat. 1003 (1920), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 951 (1953).
26. 41 Stat. 1C04 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 954 (195S).
27. 41 Stat. 103 (1920), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 951 (1953).
23. 41 Stat. 1C04 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 953 (1953).
29. In The Thomas Barium, 293 U.S. 21, 52, 1934 Am. Mar. Cas. 1415, 1417 (1934X
the Supreme Court held the Ship Mortgage Act constitutional. Earlier the question ha?
been raised and passed upon in The Fort Orange, supra note 17; The Northern No. 41,
supra note 17; The Acropolis, 1924 Am. Mar. Cas. 1510 (E.D.N.Y. 1924); The Lincoln
Land, 295 Fed. 353 (D. -Mass. 1923), modified on rehearing, 295 Fed. 363, 1924 Am. Mar.
Cas. 194 (1924); The Nanking, supra note 17; The Oconee, 2S0 Fed. 927 (E.D. Va. 1922).
30. The Jones Act, 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 63S (1953), which formed a part
of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, was held constitutional in Panama R.R. v. Johnson,
264 U.S. 375, 1924 Am. mar. Cas. 551 (1924). An earlier preferred ship mortgage case reached
the Supreme Court in lorse Drydock & Repair Co. v. Steamship Iorthem Star, 271 US.
522, 1926 Am. Mar. Cas. 977 (1926), but the issue of constitutionality was not raised.
31. The act provided that the Government might sell vessels with mortgages up to
fifteen years, 41 Stat. 990 (1920), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § $64 (1953). The final proviion,
replaced an earlier version of the bill which permitted the Government to give mortgage.
only up to ten years. 53 Cong. Rec., pt. 3, 8146, S150 (1919).
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realized prior to the contingency of the Court passing adversely on the
constitutional issue.
The first wave of cases following the early postwar depression resulted
in only one case which reached the Supreme Court 32 and surprisingly
there was little extended attack upon the jurisdictional doubts which beset
the draftsmen of the statute. The lower courts were favorable to the
mortgages generally, but a high degree of emphasis on the formalities
of the act developed. It has been suggested that the early strictness of
construction was due to a combination of factors; namely, the doubts
attending the validity of the legislation, a desire to save the law by con-
struing it narrowly and the extended period which elapsed before the
Supreme Court finally pronounced the Ship Mortgage Act constitutional."
The depression, starting with the crash of 1929, produced a somewhat
smaller volume of reported cases than the earlier depression of the 1920's,
but was far more significant in setting out the markers for the future
history of the preferred ship mortgage. In particular, it gave rise to
The Thomas Barlum,34 which posed a formidable challenge to both the
scope and the constitutionality of the act. The first encounter in the
district court appeared simple enough." The mortgagee, Detroit Trust
Company, as trustee, sought to foreclose on two defaulted mortgages.
Opposition came not from other lienors, but (at least formally), from
the mortgagors who claimed that the act was unconstitutional. This
assertion was disposed of in a brief opinion which held the act merely
a procedural innovation. Then, having perfunctorily denied the initial
challenge, the court tried the case on the basis of a new issue."0 The
mortgagors' counsel argued that the proceeds of the loans secured by the
mortgage had been applied to uses unrelated to the ship and to the
maritime industry. The judge, after trial, found this claim to be true.
Notwithstanding his finding, however, he held the purpose of the act
was to encourage the financing of ships, reasoning that to encourage
investment in ships, one must protect the investor rather than the ship-
owner. The burden of policing the use of the funds by the shipowner,
therefore, was not to be placed on the investor. A majority of the appel-
late court did not agree.37
Judge Manton held that if the funds lent to the shipowner were not
32. Steamship Northern Star, supra note 30.
33. Lord & Glenn, The Foreign Ship Mortgage, 56 Yale L.J. 923, 927 (1947). One writer
felt the delay also inhibited American participation in international conventions. Prlce,
op. cit. supra note 8, at 231-33.
34. See note 29 supra.
35. 56 F.2d 455, 1932 Am. Mar. Cas. 931 (W.D.N.Y. 1932).
36. 2 F. Supp. 733, 1933 Am. Mar. Cas. 1384 (W.D.N.Y. 1933).
37. 68 F.2d 946, 1934 Am. Mar. Cas. 464 (2d Cir. 1934).
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used for shipping purposes, they were outside the scope of the admiralty
law, and therefore, outside the protection of the act. The act, he said,
was constitutional, but only as limited to the narrowly bounded juris-
diction of the maritime field. The opinion emphasized the personal,
freewheeling transactions of Mr. Barlum, chief stockholder of the owner-
corporation and dwelt upon the importance of the recording provisions
of the statute. Somewhat gratuitously, Judge Manton referred to the
mortgagee's knowledge, although the mortgagee was only a trustee for
the investors.
judge Augustus Hand dissented, noting that the Detroit Trust Com-
pany was a trustee of publicly offered bonds within the ambit of the act.
Demonstrating an awareness of the underlying significance of public
financing and credit devices, Judge Hand said that real estate attracted
capital precisely because the use of the funds was unrestricted. Curi-
ously, the argument of estoppel on the part of the mortgagor who received
the fruits of the bargain (even if illegal) was not used by any of the
judges,3s all of whom considered only the broader issues. With the
issues clearly drawn, the Supreme Court granted certiorari,19 and in the
next term rendered a unanimous opinion."
Chief Justice Hughes, in a characteristically articulate opinion, com-
menced with a factual recitation which foreshadowed his conclusion. In
particular, he stated that the case was one dealing with negotiable bonds
largely held by the general public. He considered the historical ante-
cedents of bottomry and respondentia bonds which, he noted, were not
limited to maritime purposes. He reiterated and expanded Judge Hand's
argument that Congress set no limitation on the use of funds invested in
ship mortgages for the very purpose of attracting capital to the maritime
field. The decision reversed the holding of the circuit court which tech-
nically had also held the Ship Mortgage Act constitutional, but the
Chief Justice went much further. The mortgage was made the object of
the act's protection and investors were, in effect, informed that the
future course of the law would tack in their favor.
IV. PECULIAMnrIES OF MAMT= SECURIT
The Thomas Barum assured both industry and finance that the pre-
ferred ship mortgage was here to stay. It remained to be seen, however,
3S. The brief of libelants-appellees did assert estoppel. Brief for Libelants-Appies,
pp. 38-43, pt. IV, The Thomas Barium, 6S F.2d 946, 1934 Am. Mfar. Cas. 464 (2d Cir.
1934), although it was not mentioned on re-argument. The claim again appeared in a short
paragraph of the petition for writ of certiorari (id. at 34, pt. A), but did not appear in
the succeeding briefs, nor was any response made by the other party.
39. 292 U.S. 619, 1934 Am. Mar. Cas. 328 (1934).
40. See note 29 supra.
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to what degree the peculiarities of the maritime field would modify this
new type of security.
Ship mortgage problems of a legal nature may be classified as (a) those
affected by jurisdiction and (b) somewhat facetiously, "all others."41
We shall, however, characterize the latter category as "priorities of
maritime liens." The classification is, of course, arbitrary, but the writer
deems it a convenient approach to a large area in which comparatively
little definition has been achieved by case law. In fact, the problems
raised under the term "jurisdiction" represent special modifications of
priorities as well as procedure. We start with the former category be-
cause it will lead the general reader or practitioner into more familiar
patterns and, at the same time, touch on the broader problems to which
the maritime mortgage is subjected.
A. Intrajurisdictional Problems
Competition among various courts to obtain lawsuits, such as charac-
terized a large part of the jurisdictional development of the English
legal system, is not a notable feature of our judicial life today. Indeed,
it sometimes appears to be the reverse, with the courts inviting
litigants to go elsewhere. The federal system has a special jurisdictional
situation which arises out of the branches of law set up as separate juris-
dictions within the federal courts by the Constitution and by subsequent
legislation.42
Pragmatically, there are strong reasons for giving this our first atten-
tion. Since foreclosure is the main weapon of the mortgagee (and this
by the terms of the act can only be accomplished in admiralty) ,4 any
frustration in instituting such a suit is a primary source of concern to
the mortgagee. It is in the competing federal sources of jurisdiction,
41. The N.Y. Times Business Activities Index contains two categories of "Carload-
ings": "Miscellaneous" and "All Others"; they are not facetious.
42. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1, and the Judiciary Act of 1789, now 28 U.S.C. §
1333 (1958), which deals with admiralty jurisdiction. Bankruptcy jurisdiction Is set forth
in 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1958) and patents in 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1958). In addition, the grants
are spelled out in the individual titles. Various other areas, e.g., administrative acts, criminal
and equity jurisdiction, and others are listed and discussed in 4 Benedict, Admiralty 187-281
(Knauth 6th ed. 1940). See also Gilmore & Black, Admiralty § 1-17, at 43, § 9-91, at 654,
§ 9-92, at 656 (1957); Robinson, Admiralty § 59, at 415 (1939).
43. 41 Stat. 1003 (1920), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 951 (1958); see 4 Benedict, op. cit.
supra note 42, § 614, at 237; The Fort Orange, 5 F. Supp. 833, 1934 Am. Mar. Cas. 240
(S.D.N.Y. 1933). However, Gilmore & Black, op. cit. supra note 20, § 9-94, suggests the
bankruptcy court might be so empowered. See also Waechter, Adjudication of Maritime
Liens in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 10 Tul. L. Rev. 461, 466 (1936); 1 Benedict, op. cit.
supra note 42, § 17, at 28.
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specifically bankruptcy,44 that such procedural frustrations are likely to
arise first.45
Historically, the greater part of the pertinent case law is contempo-
raneous with The Thomas Barlum, which arose out of the Great Depres-
sion that contributed the second wave of preferred ship mortgage
cases. 6 Situations of insolvency and bankruptcy, involving resort to the
bankruptcy and equity side of the federal courts, reflect the deeper eco-
nomic difficulties of that period. Although the number of such cases is
scant, they provide almost all the authority extant on procedural conflicts
arising from intrajurisdictional sources in the federal courts.
In The Fort Orange,47 the mortgagor had defaulted on a three million
dollar loan, and the mortgagee sought foreclosure both in admiralty and
in equity. The mortgages, four in number, which covered four Hudson
River liners as well as shore-side property, had been recorded in Man-
hattan at the customs house and at the county clerk's office. Judge Knox
entertained the suitors now as equity or bankruptcy judge, now as ad-
miralty, and sometimes all at once. 6 The result was a single disposition
of the many faceted situation with what appears to have been a minimum
of court time. The court did not appear to be troubled by the suggestion
that invoking equity might have vitiated the admiralty phase. Hence,
44. Theoretically and practically, the other areas may cut across or overlap admiralty's
sphere, e.g., criminal (The Maberhex, 6 F.2d 415, 1925 Am. Mar. Cas. 1503 (D.RI. 1925)),
but no conflict appears likely.
45. The bankruptcy court is given exclusive jurisdiction over the bankrupt and its estate,
with control over assets and the right to determine title. Collier, Bankruptcy Manual § 2,
at 30-31 (194S). Chapter XI arrangements vest exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor and
his property, where located, and a chattel mortgagee must have leave of the court to retake
possession. Collier, supra para. XI-1, at 1060. The state courts furnish a possibility of this
phenomenon within very narrow limits in accordance with the strictures laid down in
Moran v. Sturges, 154 U.S. 256 (1S94). See also The WIillamette Valley, 62 Fed. 293 (N.).
Cal. 1894), aff'd, 65 Fed. 565 (9th Cir. 1S95); The J. G. Chapman, 62 Fed. 939 (D. minn.
1S94); f. Paxeon v. Cunningham, 63 Fed. 132 (1st Cir. 1S94) which indicate libels in
admiralty are permitted if the state court authority lacks custody or has allowed the
vess-el to go into another jurisdiction. See also The Ironsides, 13 Fed. Cas. 103 (No. 7059)
(N.J). Ill. 1S69) (dictum). This opinion has interesting remarks on bankruptcy and
admiralty jurisdiction. One of the few articles in point is Wacechter, supra note 43, 10 Tul.
L. Rev. 461 (1936).
46. Although the early preferred ship mortgage cases cited elsewhere in this article
involved insolvency, the question of jurisdiction did not receive comment. In one of the
earlier matters before a bankruptcy court, the case went forward by stipulation that all
admiralty rights could be asserted there. In re Atlantic, Gulf & Pac. SS. Co., 3 F2d 369,
310-11, 1924 Am. Mar. Cas. 131 (D. Md. 1923).
47. 5 F. Supp. 833, 1934 Am. Mar. Cas. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).
4S. See 1 Benedict, op. cit. supra note 42, § 17; Gilmore & Black, op. cit. supra note 20,
§ 9-94.
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The Fort Orange represented a practical combination of the federal
sources of jurisdiction which enabled the mortgagee to foreclose with a
minimum of procedural obstacles. If anything, the plurality of legal
areas aided the solution.49
A different result is illustrated by The Alabama cases." There a mort-
gagee sought access to his security without avail. Apparently, a receiver-
ship had been initiated in an equity proceeding to which the mortgagees,
if not consenting participants, were at least acquiescent observers. On
the first attempt to reach the mortgaged ship, the court observed that
the lender's debt was in no danger. To allow immediate foreclosure, the
opinion said, would be inequitable to junior lienors and holders of certifi-
cates of indebtedness."
The Alabama mortgagees made a second try to reach their security
with no greater success than the first, notwithstanding the remark by the
appellate court that it doubted the receivership would operate at a profit.
The court did not delve into the Ship Mortgage Act or its intent, but it
did compare the situation to that of ordinary mortgages. The circuit
judges concluded that a court of equity with plenary power was more
likely to represent the interest of all creditors than was an admiralty
court. Then, in a rather formal conclusion to an otherwise generalized
approach, the court invited the mortgagees to enter the equity pro-
ceedings. 2
The jurisdictional problems in The Alabama were possibly more diverse
than in The Fort Orange. The Alabama was one of six vessels owned by
49. For foreclosure on different types of property in the same court simultaneously In-
volving admiralty and equity, see Collier Advertising Serv. Inc. v. Hudson River Day Line,
14 F. Supp. 335, 1936 Am. Mar. Cas. 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1936).
50. The Alabama (Consumers' Co. v. Goodrich Transit Co.) 53 F.2d 972, 1932 Am. Mar.
Cas. 418 (7th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 548 (1932), later proceedings, 63 F.2d 273,
1933 Am. Mar. Cas. 976 (7th Cir.), cert. granted but decree reversed with direction to
dismiss as "moot," 290 U.S. 585 (1933) (per curiam). For a description of equity receiver-
ships at various historical stages see 4 Benedict, op. cit. supra note 42, at 211.
51. The rights of creditors for the period during which the vessel has been in the court's
jurisdiction have not been well defined, although several opinions treat various aspects of
the problem, e.g., New York Dock Co. v. Steamship Poznan, 274 U.S. 117, 1927 Am. Mar.
Cas. 723 (1927); United States v. The Audrey II, 185 F. Supp. 777, 1960 Am. Mar. Cas.
1977 (N.D. Cal. 1960). For pre-preferred mortgage situations see note 45 supra.
52. A similar suggestion was made by judge Learned Hand in In re Interocean Transp.
Co. of America, 232 Fed. 408, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1916). However, in In re Munson S.S. Line,
1938 Am. Mar. Cas. 837 (S.D.N.Y. 1938), judge Coxe indicated that the Government as
mortgagee had not waived its rights because there had been no prior voluntary appearance,
and also because of an express reservation. See also Robinson, op. cit. supra note 42,
§ 59, at 417; Hudson v. New York & Albany Transp. Co., 175 Fed. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1909),
aff'd, 180 Fed. 973 (2d Cir. 1910).
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the debtor corporation. It was the only vessel operating at a profit, as
well as the only ship covered by a mortgage. Presumably, the other five
ships were in another judicial district which may have deprived the
equity court of jurisdiction. The case poses the problem which the mort-
gagee may face upon default: The security may not be available for
prompt satisfaction of the debt.
In a recent series of foreclosures commencing in 1960, a preliminary
step taken by one group of mortgagors was to file Chapter XI petitions
for voluntary reorganization.53 The filing had the immediate effect of
sealing off the assets so far as the mortgagee and other lienors were
concerned. The referee assumed he had jurisdiction of all the corporate
assets and that pursuant to local rules, 4 process could not be issued
against the debtor's estate. One eager creditor libelled a vessel on the
west coast," returned to the New York proceeding," confessed his actions
and received absolution, thus permitting the libel to go forward. Another
filed libels in rem in New York ' 7 where the corporations were, but not
the ships. He then proceeded to request the referee's permission to libel
the ship in rem in Texas and to intervene in another proceeding in
France.s Other creditors literally followed suit. Shortly thereafter,
53. In re North At. Marine Co., 60-B-20, S.D.N.Y.; In re Marine Bulk Carrieas,
Inc., Civil Nos. 94621-22, 60-B-3, S.DN.Y.; see also Civil Nos. 94614-17, C0-B-3, S.D.N.Y.
54. Bankruptcy Rules, S.D.N.Y., 15(b); Bankruptcy Rules, E.D.N.Y.. X-11(b). There
is a question as to whether these rules fall within the ambit of Miner v. Atlaz,
363 U.S. 641, 1960 Am. Mar. Cas. 1267 (1960). In that case, the Court held certain
rules to be beyond the power of the local courts in admiralty. The decision casts a
cloud upon the indirect incursion of these bankruptcy rules into the admiralty sphere. In
nonmortgage matters, libels in rem were restrained where no permlssion had been obtained
from the bankruptcy court. Moran Towing & Transp. Co. v. Barge Puerto Rico, 195S
Am. Mar. Cas. 130 (S.D. Fla. 195S). The brief report is devoid of details. Judge Mforton
in The Robert & Edwin, 32 F.2d 390, 1929 Am. far. Cas. 6S6 (D. Mass. 1929) similarly
held that bankruptcy placed the vessel in custodia legis, putting the vesel beyond admiralty
process, although no receiver or trustee had been appointed and the petition was voluntary.
The court added that the same judge would be reviewing the queztions, whether in
bankruptcy or admiralty. In a seaman's personal injury claim, denial of a civil jury trial
was held to be arbitrary where the court below had indicated that the claim againet the
debtor in bankruptcy was to be tried before a master. Foust v. Mun-on SS. Linec, 299
U.S. 77, 1936 Am. Mar. Cas. 39S (1936).
55. Irving Trust Co. v. The Golden Sail, 197 F. Supp. 777 (D. Ore. 1961) (later
proceedings).
56. In re Marine Bulk Carriers, Inc., Civil Nos. 94621-22, 60-B-S, S.DX.Y.
57. The Wang Importer, 60 Ad. 59, S.D.N.Y., Jan. 13, 1960; The Ozark, C0 Ad. C0,
S.D.N.Y., Jan. 1S, 1960.
58. E.D. Tex., Ad. 678, modified sub nom. Barnouw v. The Ozark, 304 F.2d 717
(5th Cir. 1962); The Wang Importer, Tribunal de Grande Instance, St. Nazarie, May 26,
1961 (unreported French opinion). See also note 93 infra.
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permission was given to proceed with the admiralty actions, and the
Chapter XI proceedings were dismissed.
The briefness of the proceedings before the referee, together with his
orders permitting the admiralty matters, were probably responsible
for the lack of reported opinions on this phase of the litigation. The
bankruptcy court was alert to the practical effect of the petitions and
was quick to divest itself of jurisdiction when the economic situation
proved hopeless.
A case which posed many of the issues raised by diverse jurisdiction
within the federal court system, but which goes unnoted except for a
few footnotes in the treatises, is Texas Co. v. Hauptman."0 In February
1936, the California shipowner commenced a section 77B bankruptcy
proceeding 0 in California and obtained a court order to continue the
business. In May of that year, a trustee in bankruptcy was appointed
and a restraining order issued. In July, Texas Company, a California
corporation, asserting a lien for oil supplied in the previous year, libelled
the ship in rem in Texas. The trustee promptly obtained an order to
show cause in California to obtain the ship's release. The federal judge
directed release of the vessel and restrained further action without leave
of his court.
On appeal, the appellate judges drew a line between suit against the
debtor and suit against the debtor's property." They said the district
judge's order restraining suit was not authorized under the Bankruptcy
Act.02 Nevertheless, the majority found a property right in the trustee
over which the California court had exclusive jurisdiction which pre-
empted the Texas court. Since there were other property rights over
which the lower court had no jurisdiction, the appellate court held that
the district court order was too broad and suggested modification unless
those other rights were inseparable.
The casual comment indicating that the rights were separable and
that the vessel might be sold subject to the right of the trustee, appeared
to provide a built-in guarantee for confusion, thereby undoing most of
the reasoning of the opinion. No indication was given by the court as
to the nature of the sale it envisioned in Texas, i.e., whether it was a pro-
59. 91 F.2d 449, 1937 Am. Mar. Cas. 1217 (9th Cir. 1937) cited in 1 Benedict, op. cit.
supra note 42, § 17, at 29, as authority for the bankruptcy court's superiority.
60. Bankruptcy Act § 77b, 47 Stat. 1474 (1933), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 205(b)
(1958).
61. A British court made a similar holding with respect to a sale in Egypt with court
approval. Since the court held the sale was in bankruptcy, the salvage lien in admiralty
was not affected. The Goulandris, [19271 P. 182.
62. 30 Stat. 544 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1255 (1958) (Supp. III, 1959-
1961).
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ceeding involving all lienors in a ranking of priorities with a distribution
of the fund in Texas, or a sale of the supply lienors' interest subject to
the interest of the trustee or any other lien. Nor is it clear what, as a
practical matter, was left to the trustee in bankrupcty0C
The dissent said that a trustee gets only the interest of the debtor
and that the trustee, therefore, never had what the Texas court pos-
sessed. 4 Thus, the minority gives geographic jurisdiction to the lienor
in Texas and permits the California trustee to go there to assert his
rights. The majority, on the other hand, reverses the geographic initia-
tive." If ships were operable in sections and the rights in them were
in separate physical segments, this theory might make sense. But
absent these conditions, the solutions suggested by the court appear to
raise as many potential problems as are solved.
The case is instructive for showing that none of the judges felt the
difference of districts, per se, created difficulties. It also indicates the
power of the federal courts to deal with intricate situations likely to
arise under the Ship Mortgage Act, although it may have little to offer
in situations even slightly more complex. The remark in the majority
opinion that the district court in California could deal with the situation
if it found the rights of the various parties in the vessel were inseparable,
points the way to a constructive solution of many problems since, as a
practical matter, it is doubtful that the case would be otherwise.
In The Tradewind,6 another solution was provided. The shipowner
fied a voluntary petition in bankruptcy in the District of Columbia.
The following day, a supply lienor libelled the ship in the federal court
in Baltimore. The Washington proceeding was then transferred to the
District of Maryland where other claimants intervened. The ship, which
was the only asset of the corporation, was sold by the marshal pursuant
to an admiralty decree, and the proceeds were distributed to the lienors.
Obviously, the geographic facts simplified the process, but the case is
instructive. It demonstrates flexibility within the federal system and,
in this respect, is similar to The Fort Orange.37
63. The trustee appeared to have a definitive interest, at least with respzct to a
$20,000 right in the mortgage, which lends some practical sense to the language in both
the majority and minority remarks.
64. 91 F.2d at 452-55, 1937 Am. Mlar. Cas. at 1223-23.
65. Mr. Knauth felt the discussion of this case with respect to posze:--on and title
was significant. 4 Benedict, op. cit. supra note 42, § 614, at 237 n.SI. In terms of
operating large deep-sea vessels, "possession" is a vague concept except at the symbolic
moment the marshal is physically present to serve the ship.
66. Atlantic Steamer Supply Co. v. The Tradewind, 144 F. Supp. 403, 1956 Am. Mar.
Cas. 1731 (D. Mld. 1956), later proceedings, 153 F. Supp. 354, 1957 Am. Mfar. Cas. 2195
(D. Mld. 1957).
67. See note 47 supra.
1962]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
The situation of the maritime mortgagee, on the whole, is not markedly
different from the shore-side counterpart where bankruptcy in some form
intervenes. Perhaps the maritime lienor may draw comfort not afforded
the real or chattel mortgagee to the extent the ship sale in foreclosure
must be in admiralty. 8 However, the trustee of the debtor may have to
invoke local remedies in ordinary real or chattel dispositions in bank-
ruptcy, in which event, questions of control of the sale may arise. Prac-
tically speaking, the bankruptcy court (or the federal judge exercising
his varied functions) has shown little inclination to insist on general
creditors' rights as against secured creditors' rights in the few ship
mortgage cases where a possible conflict arose. Usually the ship was
the sole asset of significance and the course was very well marked in
this regard.
A factor which realistically inhibits the incursion of other jurisdictions
into admiralty is the nature of the res. The vessel is a chattel, but a
rather special type, especially the large merchantman.0 9 There is not
only the ordinary venture risk attendant upon any court involvement in
an ailing business, but unusual costs of maintenance, wharfage, watch-
men or stand by crew, "winterizing" and so forth. These are not condu-
cive to procrastination. The exigencies call for prompt action. The
attorneys in these circumstances are not likely to enter into academic
debates over a court's jurisdiction, but, under the pressures of the imme-
diate situation, are more apt to ask a court's indulgence and cooperation
so that the value of the ship may be conserved. The high cost of the
preservation of the res renders interim solutions generally undesirable.7 0
Even the small delays encountered with jurisdictional problems may cause
justifiable anxiety on the part of the secured creditor.
The case law on questions of intrafederal jurisdiction is insufficient to
furnish definitive answers. New situations will undoubtedly be dealt with
on an ad hoc basis and probably with the consent of the parties. The
68. But see note 43 supra. The secured maritime creditor has been held not subject
to bankruptcy expenses, although preservation expenses will have priority. The Bethulla,
200 Fed. 879 (D. Mass. 1912).
69. In 4 Benedict, op. cit. supra note 42, § 613 a few of the obvious physical dangers
to creditors are noted. Other nonphysical problems involve the status of interim creditors.
See note 51 supra.
70. Apparently, the rarity of receiverships with respect to vessels must be attributed to
this. In The Southern Cross, 23 F. Supp. 613, 1938 Am. Mar. Cas. 839 (E.D.N.Y. 1938), the
court exhibited great reluctance to appoint a receiver in the absence of a provision In the
mortgage, notwithstanding the statutory language of the Ship Mortgage Act of 1920, 41 Stat.
1004, 46 U.S.C. § 952 (1958). In Tietjen & Lang Dry Dock Co. v. The Deepwater, 1939 Am.
Mar. Cas. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1939), strict protective measures were laid down by the court
as a condition to granting the mortgagee's receivership request in what the court deemed an
unpromising situation.
[Vol. 31
SECURITY AT SEA
case law does indicate sufficient resourcefulness on the part of the federal
courts to facilitate prompt solutions and this is much to the benefit of
the mortgagee.
B. Problems of Federalism
The Ship Mortgage Act 71 is national in character and hence, the sub-
stantive content to be supplied in interpreting the law should be con-
sonant with the national needs of the Merchant Iarine rather than an
accommodation of localisms: 2 There has been little or no dispute with
respect to the foregoing proposition, but potential difficulties attend its
realization. The act, although detailed with respect to certain formali-
ties, is largely a generalized outline built on unstated assumptions which
flow from a long history of mortgage law. However, with respect to
many of its intricacies, mortgage law has had different developments in
the different jurisdictions within the United States thus suggesting areas
of ambiguity for which no clear guide is afforded.
The lawyer, like others, tends to consider problems in terms of refer-
ences which reflect his own local experience. Where the new problem
appears in familiar guise, the usual process of identification is reinforced.
Unless the act gives specific direction, the lawyer is likely to supply the
content of his local mortgage law without considering the possibility of
alternate solutions. This danger of parochialism springs more from un-
awareness of the existence of questions (or time pressures which do not
permit sufficient consideration and research to raise and cover such
questions), rather than from a conscious preference for local law.
Fortunately, this is largely a theoretical problem for few cases have
exhibited any aspects of it, and even there, the results were justifiable
on other grounds. The problem is, therefore, scarcely a risk factor for the
investor, but it calls for an admonition to the attorney both as draftsman
and advocate which may help him focus on points that might otherwise
be overlooked or unjustifiably taken for granted. The exigencies of
practice frequently cause the initial views of counsel to pattern his ap-
proach to particular problems and consequently, the lawyer will not
easily be led to question the generalizations upon which his views are
drawn.
The effect of a mortgage on after-acquired property is illustrative of
potential problems of the type under discussion. Thus, Judge Healy in
The Hntington Sanford,73 holding that certain appurtenances to the
71. 41 Stat. 1000 (1920), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 911-S4 (1953) (Supp. III, 1959-
1961).
72. See Gilmore & Black, op. dt. supra note 20, § 9-57, at 59D-92.
73. 73 F. Supp. 67, 194S Am. Mar. Cas. 960 (D. Mass. 1947). See also text accompany-
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ship were covered by the mortgage, noted that the items were, if not on
the ship at the time of the mortgage, replacements of such items. The
rationale implicit in his remarks is that absent the replacement feature
or the presence of the items at the time the mortgage was made,
the mortgage would not have covered the items. This is, in effect, the
Massachusetts rule which holds that even with an after-acquired property
clause the mortgage is ineffective to create an equitable mortgage in
personalty.74 However, only a few jurisdictions follow this rule.15 Paren-
thetically, on the merits, it might be added that the view does not seem
to be in accord with the nature of the shipping chattel, still less with
the statutory "whole vessel. 178 The draftsman is not given much scope
by the Massachusetts view, but the advocate might be alert to draw
the court's attention to the alternative views which exist and which may
provide a more appropriate interpretation of the Ship Mortgage Act17
Judge Chesnut in Bard v. The Silver Wave,78 discussing the nonpreferred
mortgage, referred to the mortgagee in legal theory as being the owner.
Yet, this is true of real mortgages in only a few states;t " and it is by no
means universal as regards chattels.80
ing note 138 infra. Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 265 (1935) notes the problems
caused by conflicting after-acquired property rules.
74. See Moody v. Wright, 54 Mass. (13 Met.) 17 (1847). This, however, does not
apply to items added by accession as fixtures to realty where no after-acquired clause
is necessary. See Osborne, Mortgages § 41, at 103 (1951). But difficulties arise as to
what constitutes a fixture, id. at § 38; see also 2 Tiffany, Real Property § 606 (3d ed.
1939).
75. See Osborne, op. cit. supra note 74, § 37, at 83 n.91.
76. 41 Stat. 1000 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 921 (1958); see also text accompanying notes
140-51.
77. Judge Knox in The Fort Orange, supra note 17, distinguished between federal law
as applied to maritime property and local law with respect to shore-side personalty
where the equitable mortgage on after-acquired property was recognized, but subordinated
to the general creditors and the trustee in bankruptcy.
78. 98 F. Supp. 271, 1951 Am. Mar. Cas. 1079 (D. Md. 1951).
79. Osborne, op. cit. supra note 74, §§ 14-15; Walsh, Mortgages § 5 (1934); 2 Wlltsle,
Mortgage Foreclosure § 827 (3d ed. 1939).
80. Regarding a chattel mortgage on a ship: "A mortgage in Texas, no matter what
the form of the papers by which it is given, only gives a lien, conveys no title. In
Texas once a mortgage, always a mortgage." The Oriole (Jones v. Horton & Horton, Inc.),
100 F.2d 345, 346, 1938 Am. Mar. Cas. 1580, 1582 (5th Cir. 1938). Even the rule with
respect to title transfer in chattel mortgages in New York, though broadly stated, is
subject to many limitations. Cf. North River Coal & Wharf Co. v. McWilliams Bros.,
32 F.2d 355, 1929 Am. Mar. Cas. 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1929), aff'd, 37 F.2d 22, 1930 Am. Mar.
Cas. 204 (2d Cir. 1930) (ship chattel mortgage matter). The Supreme Court Indicated
it followed the title theory states for purposes of ship mortgages (before the act of
1920), The John Jay, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 399 (1854) (dictum), but later remarks are
more cautious, e.g., the nonpreferred lien is "much closer to ownership" than a tax lien.
New York v. Maclay, 288 U.S. 290, 294 (1933).
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The mechanics of foreclosure under the act provide another opportunity
for divers interpretations. Detailed instructions, provided by most state
laws in foreclosure proceedings, is lacking in the federal law, and the hints
given are, if not obscure, ambiguous."' In view of the strict jurisdictional
provisions,"2 the variety and scope permitted in the various state statutes
(and common law) may not be available to the preferred maritime mort-
gagee, but it would not hurt to add clauses of right to possession and
power of sale, leaving to the courts the question of their efficacy. 3
Judge Leibell, in a matter before him, told counsel they would be well
advised to follow the procedure outlined in the New York Real Property
statute to obtain a discharge of record from a recalcitrant mortgagor and
a balking customs collector.5 4 But this was a conscious choice, insisting
not on the letter of local law but general principles of equity and notice,
to supply a guide. This ability to focus on permissible solutions under
the act and to make conscious choices is the end which the advocate must
seek if inept distortions of the law are to be avoided."5
Si. See note 132 infra.
82. 41 Stat. IC03 (1920), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 951 (1953).
33. The Ship Mortgage Act says nothing of nonjudicial foreclosure, thus raising an
ambiguity as to whether it is permissible. A few cases indicate that it is: The Challenger
(Challenger Inc. v. Durno), 227 F.2d 918 (5th Cir. 1955), where however, the failure
to foreclose privately per mortgage provision was held a waiver of those rights; The
Maberhex, 6 F.2d 415, 1925 Am. Mar. Cas. 1503 (D.R.I 1925). In realty mortgages,
some states forbid the mortgagee's possessn under any circumstances. Teal v. Walker,
111 U.S. 242, 252 (1S4). Some permit possession if the agreement so provides; some
allow it as a matter of law, with various times for exercising the right after default.
Osborne, op. dt. supra note 74, § 127. The power of sale is also a form of nonjudicial
foreclosure, but one closely controlled by statute. See, e.g., Dingus, Mortgages-Rcdemption
After Foreclosure Sale in Missouri, 25 Mo. L. Rev. 261 (1960). Nebraska judicially denies
such a power, Osborne, op. cit. supra note 74, § 337, at 992 n.11. For general diccussion
of the power in realty mortgages, see 2 Wiltsie, op. cit. supra note 79, at 1360-79. The
Ship Mortgage Act is silent on the subject, but trust deed mortgages which characteristically
have the power are expressly recognized in the act. Under the Bankruptcy Act, 30 Stat.
544 (189S), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1255 (1953) (Supp. III, 1959-1961), the Secretary
of Commerce, as assignee of the defaulted mortgage, is expressly authorized to "institute
foreclosure proceedings and in connection therewith repossess the mortgaged vessel forth-
with. . . ." 63 Stat. 1273 (1954), as amended, 46 US.C. § 1275(c)(1) (1953). The
jurisdictional limitation on foreclosure, 41 Stat. 1003 (1920), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 951
(1958), is a strong argument against the power of sale and possessory foreclosure. The
problems of title and the inability to render the ship free and dear of all liens would
be strong practical arguments against a mortgagee taking such a step in lieu of judicial
foreclosure. The mortgagee can, however, take the step and take his chances on priority
of his lien without divesting either his own or other liens. Cf. The Bergen, 64 F.2d 877,
1933 Am. Mar. Cas. 377 (9th Cir. 1933).
84. The Sdpper III (In re Suttmeier), 112 F. Supp. 196, 1953 Am. Mar. Cas. 371
(S.D.N.Y. 1952).
35. The following are areas of difference in state law which might pose a question for
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C. International Jurisdictional Problems
In terms of theoretical potential, there are few commercial problems
which are likely to be more complex than the varying legal consequences
attending the departure of a vessel for foreign shores. Notwithstanding
the broad seas of legal complexities, there is little which has been written
directly on the subject. The international aspects of admiralty law
are generally incidental or historical subjects in most of the standard
works, leaving the practitioner to odd and assorted (as well as infre-
quent) cases, occasional law review material and diverse works in related
fields of conflict of laws or international law."0 Unfortunately, admiralty
situations do not usually present themselves in categorized fashion, at
least not in the particular categories in which the treatises have been
written or in which the reporters' key-systems have been set forth. The
practitioner finds, therefore, that he must search out comparatively ob-
scure and recondite source material to deal with intricate situations.
The problem in the international field is largely the converse of what
we referred to above in the national picture as "parochialism," where the
judge (and lawyer) risked an unawareness of questions of law other
than the law with which he was familiar. The initial presence of interna-
tional legal questions presents to the judge and lawyer an ever-mounting
spectre of unknowns which may indicate some easy rationale to escape
the spreading darkness. The situation in this respect may be only one
of degree when compared to that of any legal problem impinging on a
crowded court calendar or case load. But it accentuates the need for
preliminary preparation in approaching the court as against the usual
more relaxed "learn-as-we-go" practice.
Not all of the problems are strictly legal. Communication with over-
the ship mortgagee: Does prosecution of a personal action waive right to foreclosure?
See 5 Tiffany, op. cit. supra note 74, §§ 1554-55. The writer's view is "no," but 41 Stat.
1004 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 954(a) (1958) does not explicitly negate waiver. Does the
mortgagee have a right to possession on default? See 5 Tiffany, supra §§ 1414-15; see
also note 83 supra. Does an open-end mortgage give preference to advances postdating
liens arising after the mortgage but before the advances? For differing state laws see
Note, 70 Yale L.J. 461, 462 (1961).
86. The full title of Benedict's definitive work is The Law of American Admiralty;
that of Robinson: Handbook of Admiralty Law in the United States. BUt more recently:
Gilmore & Black, The Law of Admiralty (1957), mentions the problem of conflict of
laws and refers to its various applications in the national and international scene. In a
British work more limited in subject, Price, Law of Maritime Liens (1940), the maritime
lien law of several nations was reviewed in digest form. The scope of the substantive
law and the multiplicity of maritime nations is a practical obstacle to a single general
treatise, but one may look towards increasing collection of source materials which would
facilitate an understanding of the legal situations likely to be encountered abroad.
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seas counsel can be both difficult and hazardous. Many American at-
torneys have at some time had occasion to retain a foreign lawyer to
prove some aspect of foreign law at issue in local litigation. Such American
attorneys can appreciate the semantic difficulties which crop up in trans-
oceanic lawsuits. But knotty as these situations are, the degree of the
involvement is likely to be less than that of the lawyer for the American
ship lienor. In the usual situation, the American attorney seeks a foreign
attorney's expert opinion on a particular point of foreign law upon
which attention has been focused. However, the admiralty attorney is
frequently in a converse situation when he seeks a foreign lawyer. Action
is needed abroad, but it is the American right under American law which
the admiralty attorney seeks to enforce on his client's behalf. The
American attorney becomes, in effect, his foreign attorney's "expert."
But the admiralty attorney's limited expertise does not simplify his
communication problem.
At the outset, there may be no "focus" to the problem. The American
lawyer may wish to institute an action to foreclose the mortgage or to
intervene, but he has little or no idea as to whether the remedy exists,
or in what form it exists abroad, much less of the procedure involved.
The foreign lawyer, including the maritime expert, may have only the
haziest notion of American law, of the rights which inhere in the mortgage
and of the procedural and substantive concepts governing American
maritime rights. Language barriers increase the problem. In addition to
the ordinary difficulties of translation is the fact that lawyers are dealing
in different terms of legal reference where words, often artful and archaic,
are literally meaningless in another tongue6 7 Worst of all, time is usually
"of the essence," or at least mortgagee clients understandably so believe.
The ship's stay at ports of call is usually brief, often uncertain. If the
ship does remain a convenient length of time, other creditors may be
proceeding, and by virtue of process, gain rights and priorities.
87. The language problems are of significance, often concealing the differences of
concept, or obscuring concepts by the use of words no longer meaning what they once
did. Thus, a translation of the Italian Maritime Code, art. 575, rendered "privilegiol as
"privileged lien," making it sound very like the "preferred lien" of 41 Stat. IC04 (1920),
46 U.S.C. § 953 (195S), in which event it would prime the preferred mortgage. However,
"lien" is the appropriate word, in which case it would probably be primed by the mortgage.
2 Ripert, Droit Maritime § 1044 (4th ed. 1950) was obviously misled by "give, grant,
convey, bargai and sell" in the mortgage. He believed the words meant what they
said, something which in real property, eacept to a limited etent in the "title" tates,
has not been true in this country since the early nineteenth century. See jach-on v.
Willard, 4 Johns. R. 41, 42-43 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1S09). Nor is the rule universal with
respect to personalty. See note SO supra. The danger of mistaking form for reality vas
noted in Lord & Glenn, The Foreign Ship Mortgage, 56 Yale L.J. 923 (1947).
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Attempting to reach the security, i.e., the ship, in a foreign port entails
most of the procedural difficulties outlined previously and in addition, the
unknowns of the country in which the ship is situated. Notwithstanding
the need to invoke the foreign nation's judicial processes, prior institution
of legal action at home may, ironically, be necessary. As noted earlier,8"
it may be imperative where some form of bankruptcy or other equitable
proceeding has begun in the United States, to (a) commence an admiralty
action in the federal court where the bankruptcy proceeding is pending,
(b) intervene in the bankruptcy action for permission to go after the
security (over which American law may give the referee or trustee
some aspect of "jurisdiction"), and (c) commence an action abroad.
Ordinarily, however, the real problems begin with the suit abroad, where
the ship is.
Procedural refinements of instituting lawsuits or of intervening (since
the mortgagee's litigation is often compelled by actions of others), are
matters chiefly of local interest. Beyond a minor degree of anticipation
in the way of preparation of ownership, mortgage and other related docu-
ments, i.e., certification, authentication by consuls and possibly transla-
tions, the American attorney has little to do with this phase of foreign liti-
gation. These details, however, may be important in view of the usual
need for speed.
The commencement of an action in some countries requires a great
deal of formality. The need for service on a personal representative of
the owner may make a prompt foreclosure abroad difficult should the
ship lie abandoned in a foreign port. In this respect, the American
metaphysical legal concept personifying the vessel has a practical result
of great simplicity in starting actions in rem. One can libel the ship by
filing the "libel and complaint" with the clerk in the federal district court.
The clerk then issues process, that is, he gives the attorney a document
comparable to a summons, which is delivered to the marshal. The marshal
then, if the ship is within the district, literally goes to the ship and serves
the ship by affixing a copy of the process to it. Thus, starting an
admiralty suit in rem in the United States is, from the suitor's point of
view, a minor "modern" triumph founded on a legal archaism developed
in the nineteenth century. Granted the practice might be achieved without
the fiction; we need not look small gift horses in the mouth."
88. See text accompanying notes 53-58 supra.
89. A corollary is that if the marshal cannot make physical service, the ship Is not
served. See Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, SA., 197 F. Supp. 710, 1961 Am. Mar. Cas, 1927
(E.D. Va.), aff'd, 295 F.2d 24, 1961 Am. Mar. Cas. 1952 (4th Cir. 1961), where the
United States Coast Guard, at the request of the State Department, physically prevented
the marshal from making service on the Cuban vessel.
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The procedural distinction between American actions in rem and those
of other countries has a deeper significance. The lien concept in the United
States distinguishes between rights against the property and rights
against the owner. The lien or "privilege" on the continent is less con-
ceptualized than here. In Europe, the "privilege" is essentially one against
the owner, but with a right over to his property. The difference even
exists in England despite the similarity of the source of law and the
identity of terms." This emphasizes the different content given the same
legal terms and underscores the greater need of awareness where the
legal words of different legal systems approach the appearance of identity.
In our country the lien contains a synthesis of rights which are distinct
in other places. Among these are the creditor's right to be satisfied out
of a particular piece of the debtor's property, the creditor's preferred rank
entitling him to full satisfaction to the extent of the property's value
ahead of other creditors and the right to follow the property and make a
claim on it after its ownership has been transferred.0 1 This poses a
problem transcending the substantial semantic difficulties: Does the
forum possess a remedy sufficiently similar to the American lien so that
the forum may grant relief to the lienor? 2 The answer to this question
so far as the preferred ship mortgagee is concerned, is that the foreign
courts have not found it difficult to honor the American lien.03 Non-
90. For example, the materialman in England has or had a right to proceed in rem
against the vessel, i.e., he could attach the vessel at which time a lien would arise. See
The Colorado, (19231 P. 102 (CA.); Note, 26 Harv. L. Rev. 356 (1913); see also
discussion in The Oconee, 2S0 Fed. 927, 933 (ED. Va. 1922). For a similar French
concept see 2 Ripert, op. cit. supra note 37, § 1164. Price characterizes English maritime
rights as (1) maritime liens of older nonstatutory origin; (2) statutory-maritime or
quasi-maritime liens, which are similar in rights to the first category; (3) statutory
liens or statutory rights in rem such as the materialman has; and (4) poszeory liens.
The first two categories are similar to the American maritime lien in practice, the two
latter ones to our nonmaritime liens. Price, op. cit. supra note 3, at 90.
91. The "droit de suit" or "right to follow" was the subject of discussion in The
Colorado, supra note 90, where the British court sought to assess French rights. It is
significantly added as a special right in one sentence of the Brussels Convention con-
stituting the shortest article of the treaty. Brussels International Convention on Mari-
time Liens and Mortgages art. 3 in 6 Benedict, Admiralty at 332-37 (Knauth 7th ed.
195s).
92. E.g., The Colorado, supra note 90, where the several judges differed on the nature
of the French rights in their correspondence to the English. Price, op. cit. supra note 8,
at 206, states that since the lien is an attribute of law, it may be nonexistent in non-
recognizing jurisdictions.
93. The Wang Importer, Tribunal de Grande Instance, St. Nazaire, May 26, 1961.
(unreported French opinion) where American mortgagee on American ve.cel was granted
preference over all but local costs of attachment and actual wage. The matter, now on
appeal, is in abeyance pending the appellate court's request for "expertise" on the quection
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mortgage lienors, however, have encountered numerous difficulffities.0 4
Having passed the first remedial hurdle, we come to more complex
questions, where, once again, there is little collected case law to serve as
a guide. What kind of assimilation will be made by the forum of the
American lien?95 Will it be subjected to liens of the forum in priority? 9
of American law. Deuxi~me chambre civile de ]a Cour d'Appel do Rennes, Feb. 6, 1962.
See also The Pacific Challenger (Marine Midland Trust Co. v. Pacific Challenger Corp.
of Panama), (High Ct. of Justice, Adm. Div. 1960) (British opinion on Liberian mortgage
registered in New York) 1960 Am. Mar. Cas. 2498 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), a case involving
American interests, dealing with a statute virtually identical with the American statute,
where the court denied a series of technical objections raised against the mortgage. Cf.
note 163 supra. See also general outlook of American court on Liberian mortgage under
the 1954 amendment to Ship Mortgage Act, 68 Stat. 323, 46 U.S.C. § 951 (1958); The
Aruba (Rederiaktierbolaget v. Compafiia de Navegacion Anne), 139 F. Supp. 327, 1955
Am. Mar. Cas. 1143 (D. Canal Zone 1955). Prior to the 1954 amendment, the question
of recognition accorded a foreign mortgagee was raised in The Secundus, 15 F.2d 711,
1926 Am. Mar. Cas. 1414 (E.D.N.Y. 1926), but curtly denied, 1927 Am. Mar. Cas. 641
(E.D.N.Y. 1927). For American courts' view as to possible European approach, see The
Ozark, The Kingston, and The Denton, supra note 4, where the mortgagee was preferred.
94. In the unreported matter of The Valiant Enterprise, Application No. 3 of 1960,
the Chief Justice of the Colonial Court of Admiralty of Ceylon, Colombo, declined to
entertain jurisdiction of an American captain's claim for wages and disbursrements on an
American vessel, suggesting that questions of foreign law are involved, and, therefore, the
captain should seek his remedy in America. However, in another unreported opinion an
Israeli court found no difficulty in granting the seamen relief: The Pacific Wave, Adm.
Case No. 21/60 Haifa, Israel. In The Denton, it is suggested that a foreign court would
be without jurisdiction to entertain a mortgage claim because of the express limitation
in 41 Stat. 1003 (1920), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 951 (1958). This dictum does not
appear to be justified. Many provisions of Title 46 refer only to the American scene,
although the words are not expressly limited. Thus, "any seaman" in the Jones Act, 41
Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958), is for many purposes "any American seaman."
Cf. Larsen v. Lauritzen, 345 U.S. 571, 1953 Am. Mar. Cas. 1210 (1953). Obviously the
provisions of the Code against ship transfer, 39 Stat. 730 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C.
§ 808 (1958), do not inhibit judicial sale abroad except insofar as a direct government
ownership interest may be involved. Note in this regard the more careful language of
41 Stat. 1004 (1920), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 961(a) (1958), which specifically excepts
such foreign sale. Further, the purpose of the 1954 amendment to 68 Stat. 323, as
amended, 46 U.S.C. § 951 (1958) of the act was to give reciprocal rights to foreign
mortgagees similar to those enjoyed by Americans abroad. See The Aruba, supra note 93;
The Tradewind, supra note 66. A limitation on a mortgagee's rights abroad would be a
pointless contradiction of the entire purpose of the statute.
95. See The Colorado, [1923] P. 102 (CA.), for varied approaches of the judges In
adapting French rights to English remedies. Price, op. cit. supra note 8, at 215, suggests
that the matter of proof may also be included in the subject of conflict of laws, as In
France where local requisites must be met for a foreign lien to qualify. The question
was raised and denied in The Aruba (Rederiaktierbolaget v. Compafiia de Navegaclon
Anne), 139 F. Supp. at 336-37, 1955 Am. Mar. Cas. at 1156-57.
96. Harrison v. Sterry, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 289 (1809), a nonmaritime case, Is the
leading decision for the proposition that the forum determines priorities. It Is cited by
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Wll its priority be altered with respect to liens other than those of the
forum?97 To the extent this is likely, the dilution of the mortgagee's
rights will be reflected in the risk factor of his investment. In fact, the
mortgagee has also done well here, although the amounts of the claims of
other lienors and the particular details of competing claims limit placing
great reliance on these decisions s8 Perhaps a general receptivity on the
Continent to the problems of finance capitalism and the emphasis on the
creditor 9 as against a favoritism for the repair and supplyman, furnish a
measure of reliance for the mortgagees so long as the politico-economic
situation is relatively constant.
We have approached the mortgagee's potential difficulties abroad
through the procedural aspects because realistically these provide the
form through which any forum must deal with legal disputes. There is no
question as to a choice of law; no problem of conflict of laws with
respect to limitations of available remedies in this sense. It is only after
the court has found suitable remedies from among its own forms, to
which the foreign claim may be adapted or assimilated, that the forum
may proceed to evaluate the matter. Irrespective of later decisions to be
made by the forum regarding choice of law and substantive problems, the
local legal system will govern those details which are determined to be
"procedural." 'uch may depend on the forum's definition of "procedural,"
for included in this may be the item of priority" and of the lien, itself.
Under those circumstances one must always be wary of the familiar
expression "werely procedural."
Referring to the subject of conflict of laws with respect to maritime
liens, Price writes "that this particular sphere of maritime jurisprudence
Eankes, LJ., in The Colorado, supra note 95. But see comment in text at note 115 infra
and accompanying text. In addition to priorities, the forum may grant Hens not recog-
nized by the law of the ship's flag; e.g., The Tagus, [1903] P. 44; The Milford, Sw;. 362,
166 Eng. Rep. 1167 (P. 1358), where the British courts granted a masters wage lien
which would rank a mortgage. See Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 50, illustration 1, at
S2 (1934). But in The Wang Importer, supra note 93, at 39, the French court rejected
an attempt by American pension, welfare and vacation plans to pursue remedies in France
which did not exist in America.
97. In The R. C. Rickmers, 1924 Am. Mlar. Cas. 971 (S.DN.Y. 1924), an Italian
cupplyman was subordinated to a German vessel on the ground that Italian la, adopted
the law of the flag. See also The Woudrichem, 273 Fed. 563 (E.DY.Y. 1921); The
Kaiser Wilhelm I, 230 Fed. 717 (D.N.J. 1916); The Scotia, 35 Fed. 907 (S.D1...
18S8). These decisions raise the questions of choice or conflict of laws.
98. See note 93 supra where mortgagees were accorded substantial priority.
99. Price, op. cit. supra note 8, at 221, 230.
100. See note 96 supra. See also Restatement, Conflict of Laws §§ 584-90, (03 (1934),
cf. Introductory Note, id. at 699-701.
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appears to be in a state of confusion."'1 °1 Having given the proper
perspective, he goes on to list three "solutions adopted": lex Jori, lex rei
sitae, and the law of the flag.'02 As to being "solutions," they are at best
partial; and "adopted" is a matter of interpretation. But they are useful
standards of reference to which the courts have repaired in search of ex-
planations for the decisions they have achieved. To these ought to be
added the Brussels Convention of 1926103 which has had a distinct effect
on both adjective and substantive law, although its effect with respect to
the United States and Britain, both nonsignatories, is only indirect.
The Brussels Convention governing maritime liens has been adopted
in eighteen countries. 0 4 The treaty established a single set of rights for
ship mortgagees and lienors of the acceding countries. It set forth both
procedural and substantive attributes of maritime liens and rights in
vessels. The Convention did not create a new type of security in the
sense that the Ship Mortgage Act did. 00 The signatory nations each had
their own laws with respect to rights in shipowners' property prior to
1926. But the Convention did unify those laws and make the rights
reciprocal between the participating nations.
Over the years, the treaty has been adopted in different ways, some-
times appearing first as municipal law.106 It has been interpreted and
applied differently in the various signatory countries. A member country
may or may not apply treaty law to a nonsignatory country, in which case
the local municipal law (if different from treaty law) or local conflict
of laws rule may apply. °7 This is of particular importance to the
American mortgagee since the United States (as well as Great Britain) is
not a signatory to the Brussels Convention. There may, of course, be
other treaties, and these may imply some effect upon the vessel of the
Brussels Convention, notwithstanding the fact that one country is a
nonsignatory 08
101. Price, op. cit. supra note 8, at 206.
102. Ibid. Compare Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 4S, at 75 (1934) which states
"a state has jurisdiction over all vessels flying its flag. .. " However, the comment says
that, in addition to treat, and constitution, the jurisdiction is limited in foreign territorial
waters. But see Restatement, supra § 49: chattel subject to the state of Its location; § 98:
a ship may be sold so as to give good title (illustration 1, at 151), but a real mortgago on
foreclosure may not cut off third party rights (illustration 2, at 151); see also §§ 103,
105.
103. Brussels International Convention on Maritime Liens and Mortgages, in 6 Benedict,
op. cit. supra note 91, at 382-87.
104. Ibid.
105. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
106. Price, op. cit. supra note 8, at 214-16, 235-36.
107. Id. at 215-16.
108. Cf. Meridian Trading Co. v. The Denton, 1960 Am. Mar. Cas. 2264 (S.D. Tex.
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The question of public policy may by statute or case law prefer the
local lienor, or it may entirely reject the lien claim.00 Conversely, it may
grant a lien for services rendered in a country where no such lien would
have arisen."" Certain subject areas receive special treatment in the
application of broad legal principles. Thus, the "law of the flag" is
frequently applied to and modified by labor and wage questions, and
distinctions made with respect to seamen's claims are not necessarily a
guide to other types of claims.""
The treatise writers are often vague in their statements; under-
standably, in view of the law itself. For instance, one writer states that
"French law distinguishes clearly between foreign ships and ships
carrying the French flag."1 2  Unfortunately, the substance of the
distinctions is not clear. Ripert claims that the nationality of the ship is
decisive in wage matters," 3 but elsewhere indicates the law of the place
where the ship is libelled governs, since it is also "the lex rci sitac at the
time of the birth of the lien."" 4
1960), aff'd sub nom. Brandon v. S.S. Denton, 302 F.2d 404, 1962 Am. Afar. Cas. 1730
(5th Cir. 1962).
109. That the general maritime law of liens and foreign liens are subject to local
policy has frequently been stated by American courts. See The Elfrida, 172 U.S. 126,
203 (189S); The Lottawanna, SS U.S. (21 Wall.) 553, 571-72 (1S74); The Ocone , 230
Fed. 927 (E.D. Va. 1922); The Snetind, 276 Fed. 139, 143 (D. Ate. 1921); The Kong:li,
252 Fed. 267, 271 (D. Me. 191m).
110. See The Colorado, [1923] P. 102 (CA.) (opinion of Scrutton, L.J.). Compare
Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 50, illustration 1, at S2 (1934) where valid attachment in
New York on bill of lading (giving title under English law) is held to subject English
cargo to New York lien, although no attachment is available in England.
111. The United States, for example, by statute applies its wage laws to all ships
in its ports (without regard to lien theory). See Rev. Stat. § 4529 (193), as amended,
46 U.S.C. § 596 (1953); Strathearn S.S. Co. v. Dillon, 252 U.S. 343 (1920). However, com-
pare the limited application of stautory (nonlien) tort law in Lauritzen v. Lar-en, 345 U.S.
571, 1953 Am. Mlar. Cas. 1210 (1953). Compare The Colorado, [1923] P. 102 (CA.).
Generally speaking, other continental countries give high priority to wage mattero. E.g,
French Code of Maritime Workers art. 130; French Civil Code art. 2272 (rev. cd. 1930).
The question of locally owned foreign flagships poses its own special problems which in
the past have only been the subject of an occasional American opinion relating to liens.
However, with the increased use of alien registry by American investors and particularly
with the 1954 amendment to the Ship Mortgage Act, 63 Stat. 323, 46 U..C. § 951 (1953),
these questions may be expected to increase both in number and complexity.
112. Price, op. cit. supra note 3, at 215.
113. 1 Ripert, op. cit. supra note 87, § 661. The remark is on the propostion that
the ship, the contract and the seaman are all of the same nationality.
114. 2 Ripert, op. cit. supra note S7, § 1164 reads "Les tribunaux franab admettent
sans hsitation la Ioi du lieu oii la navire est saisi et vendue; ils l'appliquent parce que
cette loi est en mime temps la lex rei sitae au moment de la naissance du prvil 7ge." The
translation is: "The French tribunals acknowledge the law of the place where the vezzel
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Contrasted to the indefinite situation in France, Italy (another Brussels
Convention signatory) eschews the application of its own law to foreign
ships to the detriment of its own suppliers and repairmen. The Italian
courts have declared that priorities are not "procedural," and have held
that they are determined by the law of the flag. This seems to be further
than most countries are willing to go." 5
Although we have noted some disharmonies arising out of the Brussels
Convention, it would be both unfair and improper to leave the impression
that the treaty has had the net effect of increasing problems in the lien
field. On the contrary, the treaty has produced a single frame of reference
to which lawyers and judges of many countries may look without the
intermediary of a foreign legal expert. If it leaves some vexing problems
unresolved, it has on the positive side achieved a standardization of rights
that is of itself valuable in assessing financial interests, and in furnishing
a ready source of comparison to those countries whose law in this field
is less precise. It is, on a less general level, a simple source of defining
lienors' rights as they may affect the American mortgagee, which defini-
tion does not exist in our own law." 0
In assessing the diversity, it is well to keep in mind that "international-
ism" is in fashion and that, as a practical matter, judges in most maritime
nations-including ours-appear to seek and make themselves receptive
to guidance in a fair application of rules. This passing note of optimism
is attached and sold, without hesitation; they apply it because it is this law which Is at
the same time the lex rei sitae at the time of the privilege." Ripert, however, did not
subscribe to the French rule, and his view bore fruit in The Wang Importer, supra note 93,
when the court distinguished an earlier French case as affecting French interests. Similar
language is found by Bankes, L.J., in The Colorado, [1923] P. 102, 106 (C.A.), but his
approach differed from the other judges who reached the same result.
115. For recent American discussion of Italian law see Meridian Trading Co. v. Tile
Denton, supra note 108. The R. C. Rickmers, supra note 97, is an American view pre-
dating the Brussels Convention. See also Price, op. cit. supra note 8, at 216-17. The
American courts differed greatly. See Harrison v. Sterry, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 289 (1809);
The Scotia, 35 Fed. 907, 911 (S.D.N.Y. 1888); The Selah, 21 Fed. Cas. 1025 (No. 12636)
(D. Cal. 1876). British courts appear to be in accord with the American view. The recent
French case, The Wang Importer, supra note 93, appears to accept priorities of the flag,
although Ripert unhappily felt the law to be contra. 2 Ripert, op. cit. supra note 87,
§§ 1163, 1292-93. Times appear to have changed since the comment was made: "Un-
doubtedly a foreign court would not prefer an American mortgagee to a native repairman."
Comment, 33 Yale L.J. 646, 651 n.25 (1924). See also Robinson, op. cit. supra note 42,
§ 66.
116. For example, it offers American courts a comparative source for interpreting
laches. If one cause is pre-eminent in the protracted mortgage litigation of the past few
years, it is the highly indefinite status of liens due to the aging process. The doctrine
furnishes a ready-made inducement to legal argument, and attorneys have been apt to
take it. The simplicity of the Brussels rule in this regard has much to commend It.
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may provide little consolation to the American attorney at the inception
of an action in the nature of a foreclosure abroad, but it does give a more
realistic appraisal of the probabilities attending the maritime mortgagees'
rights on foreign shores.1 17
V. NONJURISDICTIONAL PROBLEMS
Struggles over priorities between competing lienors and the preferred
ship mortgagee account for the bulk of decisions under the Ship Mortgage
Act."' Contests by the owner are rare,"9 and probably where he appears
it is only in name for purposes of the unsecured creditors attempting to
garner assets to salvage some portion of their loan or other services.
The act sought to carry forward the then extant lien law largely in
outline rather than detailed codification. The attempt at integrating the
older lien law with the new mortgage scheme was something less than a
complete success. In certain respects, however, the law was explicit,
namely "preferred liens."
Certain types of liens are expressly preferred by section 953 (a) 2):
seamen's wages, stevedores' wages, salvage, general average and torts.'
These claims come ahead of the mortgage"' and all other types of liens
117. The problems continue through the proceedings and thereafter. Thus, the judg-
ment may be challenged, but will be sustained if a court of general jurisdiction is involved,
The Trenton, 4 Fed. 657 (E.D. Mich. ISSO), even if the procedure differs markedly from
that of the forum in which the attack is made The Totila, ex Harald (Zimmern Coal Co.
v. Coal Trading Ass'n), 30 F.2d 933, 1929 Am. lar. Cas. 334 (Sth Cir. 1929). But in
a British case where the court approving the sale was not deemed to be one of general
jurisdiction, such as a bankruptcy court, liens were held not to be extinguished (although
even here the judgment was not attacked). The Goulandris, [19271 P. 182. See Restate-
ment, Conflict of Laws § 260, illustrations 4 & 5, at 344 (1934), which indicate forJgn judg-
ments will be recognized if rendered when the chattel is physically within the jurisdiction.
11S. E.g., "We deal again with the race for priority. . . ." Barnouw v. The Ozar:,
304 F.2d 717, 719, 1962 Am. Har. Cas. 1675, 1676 (5th Cir. 1962) ; contra, Gilmore & Blad,
op. cit. supra note 20, § 9-60. Note, however, this book predates the recent wave of
litigation.
119. The Thomas Barlum, 293 U.S. 21, 1934 Am. Mlar. Cas. 1415 (1934) is a notable
exception.
120. The Brussels Convention, 1926, art. 2, prefers (1) attachment expenses, taxes and
fees, (2) master's and crew's wages, (3) salvage and general average, (4) collision and
injury to person and property, (5) master's contract for necesaries away from the home
port. 6 Benedict, op. cit. supra note 91, at 3S3. The last category constitutes the major
difference between the European and the American system, but it is interesting to note
that the last item was strictly construed in The Wang Importer, supra note 93.
121. The act did not actually state that the mortgage lien was maritime. See Texas
Co. v. Hauptman, 91 F.2d 449, 450, 1937 Am. Mar. Cas. 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1937), but
the court "assumed" it was "substantially the same." The Brussels Convention, 1926,
appears to distinguish "liens," arts. 2-11 from "mortgages" and "hypothecations," arts. 1,
3, 12.
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irrespective of time of accrual, and therefore, are of considerable
significance to any mortgagee who contemplates operation or possession
of the vessel, or extending the period of credit, or increasing its amount
for operational purposes. 22 Only in the category of seamen's wages has
there been a significant amount of case law, which is readily under-
standable in view of the substantial amounts involved and the immediacy
of their need to the seamen. Despite their virtual incontestability, it is
an oddity that the monies are rarely paid out at an early phase of fore-
closure litigation, thus effectively thwarting the general intent of the
law that mariners be paid promptly. 23
Aside from the special categories of liens listed above, all maritime
liens prior in time to the mortgage are preferred, approximating the usual
shore-side situation: "First in time, first in right."'1' But in sea law this
expression did not state the general, although much excepted, rule: "Last
in time, first in right.' 25 This principle is based on the general theory
that, "the vessel must get on"; 2 and it is the last repairman or supply-
man who helped keep the ship on her venture and earning freight,
thereby protecting everyone's interest in her, whose rights must be
protected.
Apparently little or no thought was given to the circularity of rights
created when the position of preferred lien was given to rights antedating
the mortgage. The earlier liens, now preferred vis-h-vis the mortgage,
122. The maritime situation is not completely anomalous in this aspect of lien law.
Although most American states prefer only taxes to other recordable liens on real property,
several add mechanics', supplymen's and others to the preferred list, irrespective of time
(e.g., Alabama, Alaska, Montana, New York and Oregon); see also Million, Lesar & Martz,
Real and Personal Property, 35 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 427, 429, 449 (1960). Note there Is no
limitation on the amount of the wage preference in admiralty, as is the case in bankruptcy,
123. Not only the mortgage statute, but the entire scheme of law respecting seamen's
wages bespeaks prompt, almost forthwith payment: See Rev. Stat. §§ 4529-30 (1898),
§§ 4546-47 (1896), as amended, 46 US.C. §§ 596-97, 603-04 (1958). Nevertheless, time and
inflation have eroded the ability for prompt enforcement. Thus, Rev. Stat. § 4547 (1896),
as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 604 (1958) gave the seaman the right to immediate relief for
amounts up to $100, which at that time ordinarily would have more than covered the
bulk of ordinary wage claims. Today, this represents about a week's wages (with over-
time) for the able-bodied seaman, who therefore cannot invoke the remedy without danger
of splitting his cause of action. The frequently expressed attitude in the lower courts that
the seamen's unions can take care of the men seems to be an effective psychological counter-
weight to the written law holding that they are wards of admiralty. Vaughan v. Atkinson,
369 U.S. 527, 1962 Am. Mar. Cas. 1131 (1962); cf. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S.
539, 1960 Am. Mar. Cas. 1503 (1960).
124. E.g., United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 85 (1954).
125. 1 Benedict, Admiralty § 14 (Knauth 6th ed. 1940). This referred to liens "of equal
class."
126. The St. Jago de Cuba, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 409, 416 (1824).
1962] SECURITY AT SEA 259
ordinarily are inferior to later Hens, i.e., those postdating the mortgage.
The latter, however, are not preferred and are, therefore, below the
mortgage lien. This poses a challenge to a court's ability to rank priorities
of various classes of liens. The resulting puzzle is not unlike the children's
game which some of us knew as "hands,"'112  where one object is always
superior to another, but inferior to a third choice.
Although the preferred ship mortgagee's interest is not directly in-
volved in these circularity difficulties, there is the possibility of his
realizing something of a priority over liens which would otherwise be
preferred to the mortgage by virtue of events occurring subsequent to the
execution and recording of this document.12 It is, however, an area to
which little case law has been devoted, 12 9 despite the warnings of early
law review notes."-" It will probably be the subject of legal briefs for a
time to come in maritime law, as it will in the nonmaritime area.12 '
127. This game is played by two children, each of whom throws out his hand in one of
three positions: paper (hand extended) wraps, or defeats, rock (fist); rock, however, breahs,
or defeats, scissors (two fingers extended); scissors cuts, or overcomes, paper. Thus, one
is always superior to another, but inferior to a third choice. This is a good game for chil-
dren, and even for logicians, but not especially helpful to busine:smen or lawyers.
128. See Gulf Coast Marine Ways v. The J. R. Hardee, 107 F. Supp. 379, 1952 Am.
M1ar. Cas. 1124 (S.D. Tex. 1952).
129. Ibid; see also National Shawmut Bank v. The Winthrop, 129 F. Supp. 661, 1955
Am. Mar. Cas. 128S (D. Mass. 1955), later proceedings, 134 F. Supp. 370, 1955 Am. Mar.
Cas. 20S9 (D. Mass. 1955).
130. Kellogg, Priorities Puzzle Under the Ship Mortgage Act, 2 Wash. L. Rev. 117 (1927).
131. See United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. S1, 35 (1954), where the federal
tax was held above the local tax as "first in time"; Aquilino v. United Statcs, 363 U.S. 509
(1960) which indicated the Government's superiority is not automatic, but depcnds on at-
tributes given by local law to other rights. In Kronenberg v. Ellenville Nurzeriez & Green-
houses, Inc., 22 Misc. 2d 247, 196 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sup. Ct. 1960) the court referred to the
anomalous situation if local taxes, which always prime the mortgage, were held inferior to
federal taxes, which are inferior to the mortgage. The court noted the argument that, "state
and local taxes paid by a mortgagee become part of the mortgage debt" under § 254(3) of the
N.Y. Real Prop. Law and the usual mortgage clause. Id. at 250, 196 N.YS.Zd at 111. The
mortgagee's payment of taxes locally was held distinct from the New Britain and Aquilino
situations. In the maritime sphere, security problems have been avoided by holding the
federal tax liens nonmaritime, thus preferring the mortgagee. See The Abram H. (United
States v. Flood), 247 F.2d 209, 1957 Am. Mar. Cas. 1718 (Ist Cir. 1957) where judge
Magruder remarked, "the government's lien for taxes can reach only the taxpayer's interet
in the specific property at the time the lien attaches .... "Id. at 211, 1957 Am. Mar. Cas. at
1721. This rationale and standard language, however, v.was not necezsary to the decison
which was based on the maritime lien proposition. Nor would it be helpful in situations
where, for example, nonmaritime rights such as chattel mortgages or conditional sales affect
parts of the vessel. See First Suffolk Natl Bank v. The Air Brant, 125 F. Supp. 7G9, 1955
Am. Mar. Cas. 2130 (ED.N.Y. 1954). For results dealing with the federal tax liens and
maritime liens, see The Jane B. (United States v. Jane B. Corp.), 167 F. Supp. 352 (D.
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The ship mortgage statute is riddled with many details obscure in
purpose and puzzling in effect. The greater part will probably never cause
significant legal battles, but may well cause niggling doubts to attorneys
whose worries might have been left by the legislators to more obvious
and important problems. The provisions for sale in foreclosure proceed-
ings illustrate some of the ambiguities which may affect the liens of
various creditors and that of the mortgagee. l 2 Whatever ultimately is
sold at a judicial preferred mortgage foreclosure sale determines in large
measure the nature of the mortgagee's security.
More often than not, and perhaps almost without exception, the
marshal's auction results in a sale price insufficient to cover the mortgage,
or barely sufficient, if the mortgagee bids. The question of the nature of
the title which the marshal gives may make a substantial difference in the
bids for the vessel. This is of prime importance to the mortgagee, not
only from the aspect of its covering the extent of his debt, but also in his
frequent (forced) position as purchaser of the foreclosed ship. 13
Mass. 1958); Gulf Coast Marine Ways v. The J. R. Hardee, 107 F. Supp. 379, 1952 Am. Mar.
Cas. 1124 (S.D. Tex. 1952); United States v. The Pomare, 92 F. Supp. 185 (D. Hawaii 1950).
132. 41 Stat. 1004 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 953(b) (1958) states "preexisting claims In the
vessel" are terminated in the vessel upon sale in admiralty in a suit to foreclose the mortgage
lien. This leaves a possible inference that posterior liens survive, which would lesen the
sales price and, hence, reduce the mortgage security. A contrary interpretation would hold
that the dicta of "scraping the vessel clean" forms a basis for the statutory provisions, but
conversely it might be said that the language of the act amends the general law. 41 Stat.
1003 (1920), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 951 (1958) provides notice to recorded liens, which
indicates some posterior lienors would expressly be bound, and provides penalties on the
mortgagee in the event he fails to so notify, perhaps inferring a cutting off of such lienor's
rights. 41 Stat. 1005 (1920), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 961(c) (1958) states the vessel will be
sold free from "pre-existing claims" in a nonpreferred maritime lien foreclosure thus raising
even more possible inferences. Hence, not only posterior maritime liens, but nonmaritime lien
claims might theoretically survive, giving them a higher right than accorded preferred liens.
And "preexisting" might refer to the date of foreclosure, or to the date of the inception of
the lien being foreclosed. This section specifies that the court may insist upon a new
mortgage being issued to the mortgagee. The general intent appears to be to give equitable
scope to the court's disposal of intricate situations, and with this in mind, the broadest in-
terpretation of "preexisting" (as referring to the date of sale) might be the most appropriate.
See also note 83 supra and accompanying text with respect to alternative possibilities of
foreclosure.
133. The mortgagee will also give his attention to the nonmaritime factor of tax con-
sequences. Thus, the question of capital loss or gain, or of bad debt loss will be governed by
the applicable provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and the Regulations. See Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, § 166, 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.166-3, 1.166-6 (1961). These may decide whether a
voluntary transfer, if possible, or a foreclosure is desirable, and perhaps affect timing. Capital
loss treatment will also depend on corporate status and form of bond, Int. Rev. Code of
1954, § 165(g) 1, 2(C). Since there is no period of redemption in a preferred ship mortgage,
the loss will be the year of the foreclosure sale. 26 C.F.R. § 1.166-3 (1961).
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As indicated, the act is something less than precise in describing not
only the formalities of the judicial sale in admiralty, but also in setting
forth its substantive legal attributes. Prior to the act of 1920, admiralty
case law had surprisingly little to offer on the quality of title given at a
judicial sale. Certain nonjudicial sales could cancel all liens. "  Plainly,
nonadmiralty courts could foreclose nonadmiralty liens, but no maritime
interest of lien status was touched by such action.1 3 It did not necessarily
follow that all admiralty liens would be affected or cancelled by an
admiralty judicial sale, but a few cases and several writers said they
would (and have continued to say it emphatically).aO A favored
134. E.g., the master's sale under certain compelling circumstances. The Amelie, 73 US.
(6 Wall.) 13 (1S6); The Raleigh, 32 Fed. 633 (S.DN.Y. IS7), affd, 37 Fed. 125 (2d Cir.
1SS3).
135. Moran v. Sturges, 154 U.S. 256 (1S94). See also The Goulandris, (1927] P. 132.
136. "That the sale of a vessel, made pursuant to the decree of a foreign court of ad-
miralty, will be held valid in every other country, and will vest a clear and indefeasible title
in the purchaser, is entirely settled, both in England and America. Story on Conflict of Las,-,
§ 592. . . ." The Trenton, 4 Fed. 657, 659 (E.D. Mich. ISZO). See also The Garland, 16
Fed. 233 (ED. Mich. 1833). There are several cases which are in accord in dicta. See The
'Mary, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 126 (1315), where it was stated that an admiralty court decre
would bind all who have notice. Somewhat ambiguously, Chief Justice Marhall said
service on a vessel binds those "who have any interest," but later he indicated that it binds
those "who could assert any title." Id. at 144. See also The Syracuse, 23 Fed. Cas. 592 (No.
13716) (E.D.N.Y. 1878) (Benedict, J.); The Granite State, 10 Fed. Cas. 964 (No. 5637)
(D. Mlass. 1355), where a distinction was drawn between a possessory decree and a sale.
Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 93, illustration 1, at 151 (1934) states: "A ship belonging
to A is in port of state M The ship may he condemned and sold by a court of X, so as to
give the purchaser a title good against all claimants." Note, however, the broad remark on
real mortgage foreclosure in illustration 2. Id. at 151. In United States v. The Zarco, 137
F. Supp. 371, 374, 1961 Am. Mar. Cas. 7S, 32 (S.D. Cal. 1960) the court stated: "It is horn-
book law that a sale of a vessel in rem passes title thereto free of all liens." Similar com-
ments are made in Crabtree v. The Julia, 290 Fad 478, 482 (5th Cir. 1961); A Netherlands
decree of foreclosure of a German ship mortgage was held to cancel an earlier American
supply lien, in The Totila, ex Harald (Zimmern Coal Co. v. Coal Trading Ass'n), 30 F2d
933, 1929 Am. Mlar. Cas. 334 (5th Ci-. 1929). Inferentially assuming the doctrine, but
holding confirmation of a judicial sale incomplete, was The Admiral (Scrofani v. Miami
Rare Bird Farm, Inc.), 203 F.2d 461, 1954 Am. Mlar. Cas. 92 (5th Cir. 1953). In The Carib
Queen (Ocean Mlach. Corp. v. United States), 175 F. Supp. 23, 1959 Am. Mar. Cas. 734
(S).DNX. 1959) Judge Bryan held that foreclosure proceedings, valid on their face, veted
title to the ship in the purchaser, including all appurtenances, and no rights in the later
proceedings could be pursued. Conversely, it was held in Callivay Ice & Fuel Co. v. The
Rutheline, 131 F. Supp. 615, 1955 Am. Mar. Cas. 1335 (S.D. Tex. 1955) that items not on the
vessel at the time of judicial sale were not included in the sale "as is." In The Zarco, supra,
items removed from the vessel for repair were deemed to remain a part of it. The repair-
man was denied a possessory lien under the state law, but accorded a maritime lien on the
whole vessel. Compare The Northern Star, 1923 Am. Mlar. Cas. 1231 (E.D.N.Y. 1923) where
apparently the court felt the purchaser on an "unadjudicated mortgage" must be prepared
to defend subsequent claims, although in The Secundus, 15 F.2d 713, 1926 Am. Mar. Cas.
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phrase is that the sale in admiralty scrapes the vessel clean. 87
The 1920 legislation offered an excellent opportunity to confirm the
general statements with respect to the effect of a judicial sale in admiralty,
but neither in the broader area of maritime liens, nor in the narrower one
of the preferred ship mortgage, was a new definition supplied. Presumably,
the legislators believed that the general maritime law, in this respect, was
sufficient and, thus, they satisfied themselves with some oddly ambiguous
phrases which scarcely clarify the nature of the title at a marshal's sale.
Despite the ambiguities of the Ship Mortgage Act, no significant
doubt on the proposition that such a sale scrapes the vessel clean has been
presented in the many cases where the sales took place. Indeed, the issue,
if raised, does not appear to have merited reported court comment, except
as dicta, where the divestiture of all liens was assumed as a matter of
course.138 The marshal characteristically gives a broad general grant in
the bill of sale." 9 The mortgagee will undoubtedly find a large measure
of comfort in the absence of litigation with respect to these legislative
ambiguities, as well as in the general implicit acceptance of the proposi-
tion that a sale in admiralty cancels liens not expressly carried forward.
Argumentative possibilities aside, the construction of forty years weighs
heavily in favor of the simple approach. The theory that there is a total
divestiture of prior liens avoids esoteric and endless distinctions. Any
1414, 1415 (E.D.N.Y. 1926) the same court specified the ship would be sold free of a
claimed foreign mortgage lien. In The Angelique (Schuchardt v. Babbidge), 60 U.S. (19
How.) 239 (1856), counsel apparently picking up the thread from The Mary, supra, made
the argument that since a ship mortgage at that time was nonmaritime, a judidal sale In
rem could not foreclose such an interest. The court, however, ignored the argument and
said the petitioners should have intervened in the foreclosure proceedings or against the
proceeds. Thus, it inferentially sustained the position that all rights were cancelled. See also
Gilmore & Black, Admiralty §§ 9-85 to -86 (1957): "Here we touch the central point of our
system of admiralty law. . . . There are no cases-or almost none. . . . There is only doc-
trine. . . ." 1 Benedict, Admiralty § 11, at 21 (Knauth 6th ed. 1940). "A sale under decree
in rem is a complete divestiture of prior liens and conveys to the purchaser a free and
unencumbered title to the property. . . ." 2 Benedict, supra § 231; Robinson, Admiralty
§ 59 (1939). By way of comparison, in ordinary real estate foreclosure, the purchaser takes
the mortgagee's and mortgagor's interest and cuts off all parties to the action with Inferior
rights. 2 Wiltsie, Mortgage Foreclosure § 778, at 1261-64 (3d ed. 1939). However, even as
to superior lienors, prima facie this establishes the amount of the debt and the propriety
of the decree. 5 Tiffany, Real Property § 1523, at 596 (3d ed. 1939).
137. Robinson, op. cit. supra note 136, § 59, at 414.
138. See The Admiral and The Zarco, supra note 136.
139. Customs Form 1356, Treas. Dep't, 3:32-:34, C.R., March 1955, Form approved:
Budget Bureau No. 48-R202.3 entitled "United States Marshall's Bill of Sale of Vessel"
provides in part: "This vessel is sold free from all mortgages and other encumbrances."
There appears a footnote related to the remark: "This line may be crossed off If not com-
patible with facts."
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alternative would cast clouds on the title given, and correspondingly
would encourage prolonged litigation as well as indefinite periods of
unknown rights. 41° Clearly, however, such an approach would be more
favored by the mortgagee than other lienors.
To the extent that questions of title on a marshal's sale have arisen,
they have been in a restricted setting and are of limited value for analogiz-
ing to other situations. These cases have dealt with the inclusion or
exclusion of equipment and appurtenances at judicial sales. This subject
is frequently classified as "accession" under the ordinary mortgage or
lien law where divers answers have been provided in real and chattel
properties.141
Variations in the common-law and statutory mortgage occur in dif-
ferent jurisdictions with respect to different types of subject matter where
'"accession" is involved. A notable distinction is made with respect to
railroads, where subsitution of the elements of the security is permitted
without disturbing the lien.1' The language of the Ship Mortgage
Act points to the same result for appurtenances of a ship. It specifies that
the mortgage must cover "the whole of the vessel. 143 Courts have treated
this provision as unambiguously covering equipment and appurtenances,
but they have not gone deeply into the problem. Such items have character-
istics akin to the railroad situation. While the analogy has not been
expressly drawn, quite apart from the language of the Ship 'Mortgage Act,
the reasoning in the ship mortgage cases was similar to that in the rail-
road matters.
In The Huntington Sanford,44 the mortgagor removed several pieces
of equipment prior to the institution of process. The mortgagee went to
court and obtained the judge's order for restoration of all the items, both
on the ground that the mortgage expressly covered the equipment, and
on the basis of the statutory language. The court noted that some of the
140. The secret aspect of the maritime lien adds in this respect a peculiar difficulty.
Mr. Justice Clifford (Field, C.J., concurring) felt that for this rl'lson alone a mortgage
statute should be adopted. The Lottawanna, S3 U.S. (20 Wall.) SSS (1874).
141. See Osborne, Mortgages § 3S, at 91 (1951). The question is similar to that of
after-acquired property, but not the same. For discussion of the latter and its application
on different elements of property in a preferred ship mortgage, see The Fort Orange, S F.
Supp. 833, 1934 Am. Mfar. Cas. 240 (S.DIN Y. 1933). A mortgage clause may be helpful
in either case to express intent, but for personalty, a clause would be of no help in Masachu-
setts for after-acquired property, whereas it generally is not needed in matters of acce:zion.
See note 74 supra.
142. See Osborne, Mortgages § 39, at 96 (1951).
143. 41 Stat. 1000 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 921 (195S). This problem as it is affected po-
tentially by varying local law is preiously noted. See notes 73-77 supra.
144. 73 F. Supp. 67, 194s Am. Mar. Cas. 960 (D. Mass. 1947).
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'equipment was in aid of navigation, and, as such, became "a part of the
vessel, subject to the mortgage.' 145
In The Air Brant,141 Judge Inch, without referring to the earlier matter
-f The Huntington Sanford, held that pumps aboard the vessel pursuant
to a conditional sale147 were included in the marshal's sale following
foreclosure of a preferred mortgage. He referred to the pumps as neces-
sary for the ship's operation; as to other equipment, the court appeared to
rely on "installation." Judge Inch also cited maritime tort cases.148 He
added that since the disputed items had become an essential part of the
res, they became subject to the lien regardless of title. This remark does
not appear particularly helpful, but if the language leaves something to
be desired, the result of Judge Inch's holding was clear. The preferred
ship mortgage primed the conditional vendor.
"Installation," in a negative sense, may be an obvious rule to follow,
but it does not go far to help the solution of the more difficult and
numerous situations. Thus, objects which have never reached the ship,
and are in no way, except contractually, identified with it, constitute a
limited and easily distinguishable case from that where the objects have
been placed aboard.'49 "Installation" and "necessary" are variable terms.
145. Id. at 68, 1948 Am. Mar. Cas. at 962.
146. First Suffolk Natl Bank v. The Air Brant, 125 F. Supp. 709 (E.D.N.Y. 1954).
147. The conditional sale and chattel mortgage have been recognized in maritime objects,
but their scope, although definitely subsidiary to the preferred mortgage and maritime
lienors, remains largely undefined. Cf. Rivara v. James Stewart & Co., 274 U.S. 614, 1927
Am. Mar. Cas. 939 (1927), affirming 241 N.Y. 259, 149 N.E. 851, 1926 Am. Mar. Cas. 39
(1926) (conditional sale). See also North River Coal & Wharf Co. v. McWilliam Bros., 37
F.2d 22, 1930 Am. Mar. Cas. 204 (2d Cir. 1930), affirming 32 F.2d 355, 1929 Am. Mar. Cas.
716 (S.D.N.Y. 1929) where New York law was held to place title in the chattel mortgagees
who were, therefore, prior to state taxes. Other proceedings in the same matter, 28 F.2d
513 (S.D.N.Y. 1928), held the custom house record irrelevant, and failure to record with
the county clerk voided the mortgagee's rights. Nonpreferred mortgages arc also recognized
by the Ship Mortgage Act of 1920. See The Mariam, 66 F.2d 899, 1933 Am. Mar. Cas. 1450
(9th Cir. 1933); Brock v. Angeron, 16 So. 2d 93 (La. Ct. App. 1943). Until a newly con-
structed ship is completed and registered, a chattel mortgage may be the only security
available to the lender. See Rodgers, Ship Construction Financing, 12 Bus. Law. 140, 142,
149 (1957) ; Note, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1516 (1958). For most pleasure craft, the simplicity of
local state registration makes a chattel mortgage under state law a simpler, if less effective,
security device. However, if the craft is five tons or over, it may be registered at the
customs house nearest the owner's residence, and a preferred mortgage may be had.
148. 125 F. Supp. at 710.
149. Cf. First Safe Deposit Nat'l Bank v. The North Star, 185 F. Supp. 815 (D. Mass.
1960) where a new pilot house was completed, but remained in the builder's possession.
Citing The Air Brant, supra note 146, judge Julian held the house was not an appurtenance,
and, therefore, was not covered by a lien subordination agreement or a ship mortgage. In
The Rutheline, supra note 136, Judge Alred held articles not on the vessel at the time of the
judicial sale were not part of the sale, but the lienors were entitled to an order for their
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In The Air Brant, it does not appear whether the pumps were movable
or stationary, nor would that be likely to furnish a firm guide. In a rather
amorphous factual situation,1 ° Judge Bryan, citing both The Air Brant
and The Huntington Sanford, felt that neither of these cases furnished a
rationale which was dispositive.
Words such as "necessary," "installed," "fixed," "movable," "struc-
tural," "appurtenance," "equipment," and even "supplies," tend to blur
with increasing standardization and interchangeability of parts and
sections of vessels. Chairs may be hooked to bulkheads, but heavy hatch-
beams may be moved in every port. Large segments of a ship may be in-
corporated into other vessels. Technical advances and changing designs
make physical details a poor basis for metaphysical distinctions.
Hand in hand with industrial standardization, new financial methods
create new situations requiring accommodation of the old forms. Adapting
credit devices to take the form of title transfers is as old as the mortgage it-
self, indeed, it helped create the mortgage.r u The use of a lease may likewise
mask an extension of credit, although certain equipment such as wireless
senders and "Butterworth" pumps for tankers are uniformly leased. 2 To
give the purchaser at a foreclosure sale such equipment would be a dona-
tion of something no one in the trade would expect. But drawing the mark
as to what shall or shall not be included in the sale or subject to the
mortgage lien becomes increasingly difficult with technological changes.
Whatever else its defect, Judge Inch's solution in The Air Brant has the
virtue of simplicity. Notwithstanding his expressed reasons, the result of
his opinion gives a warning to potential creditors that regardless of legal
return. In other words, the items were subject to a hen which was not divested fince
they were not included in the sale. In The Liberator-The Cape Henry (Atlantic, Gulf &
Pac. S.S. Corp. v. United States), 2S7 Fed. 714, 716, 1923 Am. Mar. Cas. 330 (D. Md.
1923) the bankruptcy court indicated "usage would have much effect" in deciding whether
stores passed to the trustee as part of the vessel. It then held the mortgagee could not
claim stores on repossession of the ship, which were not part of the sale at the earlier
date.
150. The Carib Queen (Ocean Mlach. Corp. v. United States), 175 F. Supp. 2S3, 1959 Am.
Mlar. Cas. 92 (S.DJN.Y. 1959).
151. 3 Holdsworth, History of English Law 12S (4th ed. 1935); see also 2 Holdsworth,
supra at 579 (3d ed. 1923).
152. In The John T., 1947 Am. Mar. Cas. 32S (W.D. Wash. 1947) a ship chattel mortgage
was held not to cover leased submarine equipment which was not essential to operation
of a fishing vessel. See also The Liberator-The Cape Henry, supra note 149. The non-
mortgage cases scarcely contribute to a harmonious rationale. In The Hirondelle, 21 F. Supp.
223, 1937 Am. Mfar. Cas. 1597 (S.D. Ala. 1937), the Radio Corporation of America was
allowed to repossess radio equipment deemed both necessary to and a part of the ship,
but not used in navigation of the vessel. In The Showboat, 47 F.2d 2S6 (D. Mass. 1930)
movables were returned to the conditional seller where there was "no [structual] harm to
the ship." See also Robinson, Admiralty § 51, at 332-S5 (1939).
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terminology, the supplies or services rendered to a ship may become a part
of the whole of the vessel. This dispenses with the need to make fine and
difficult lines of distinction.
To the extent that the "accession" cases involve title, they point toward
a preference for the mortgagee, and to a lesser extent, other lienors.
Whether these cases are authoritative for other problems arising in dif-
ferent settings is questionable. At least, they furnish a clue and a possible
guide to which contrary results have not appeared under the Ship Mort-
gage Act.
The Ship Mortgage Act does provide some latitude for the imposition
of conditions at the marshal's sale.153 If the situation has not risen under
the Ship Mortgage statute, it may nevertheless be instructive to note that
the courts have, on occasion, imposed conditions on sales of vessels. One
such case, The Abaco Queen,' is indicative of the problems which are
not necessarily different, whether the mortgage in question be preferred
or nonpreferred. In that case, the mortgagee sought to foreclose and the
owner-mortgagor interposed no defense. However, the mortgagor's grantor
intervened and sought to maintain a contractual restriction on the ship's
use. The restriction which the intervenor had inserted in the bill of sale
purported to prevent the ship from sailing competing "runs" against a
prior owner, and the grantor had in turn received the ship from that
prior owner with a similar restriction (and a healthy liquidated damages
clause to back it up). The mortgagee who had financed the most recent
purchase of the vessel from the intervenor knew of the restriction, but no
mention of the covenant appeared in the mortgage. The district judge
held that since the grantor would not have sold the vessel except with
the restrictive condition, the mortgagee who knew of the provision was
bound by the equitable servitude.
The decision was sustained on appeal, 5 heavy reliance being placed
on equitable principles. The court stated that it would prevent "uncon-
scionable" conduct by the mortgagee.' Dissenting, Judge Tuttle doubted
that an inequitable situation had been presented and noted that the
mortgagee was not a party to the restrictive agreement.1 7 He added that
no limitation was placed in the mortgage of which the intervenor
was aware. He referred to the substantial liquidated damage clause
153. See Ship Mortgage Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 1005, as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 961(c)
(1958); see also note 132 supra.
154. Tri-Continental Financial Corp. v. Tropical Marine Enterprises, 164 F. Supp. 1,
1958 Am. Mar. Cas. 2507 (S.D. Fla. 1958), aff'd, 265 F.2d 619, 1959 Am. Mar. Cas. 1408
(5th Cir. 1959).
155. 265 F.2d 619, 1959 Am. Mar. Cas. 1408 (5th Cir. 1959).
156. Id. at 626, 1959 Am. Mar. Cas. at 1417.
157. Ibid.
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which inferentially indicated the remedy he felt was appropriate. Judge
Tuttle reversed the phrases of the majority contending that the mortgagee
might have withdrawn from the transaction had the intervenor insisted
on the restrictive agreement in the mortgage. Indicating fundamental
disagreement, he referred to the traditional distinctions between restric-
tions in realty and those in personalty."1e He said that the courts tended
to leave chattels unencumbered, adding that even in real estate the law
now favors unclogged titles. Thus, the dissent did not deny that
equitable principles might be applied in admiralty, but rather differed
on their possible application.
The Abaco Queen was not an instance of a judicially undefined title
having been given at a marshal's sale, but one where, at the behest of a
suitor, the court limited the title to be given. It described a situation
which could occur with respect to preferred ship mortgages. If so, it is
suggested that Judge Tuttle's language appears to lie closer to the earlier
interpretations placed upon the act. This suggestion is reinforced by the
public offering aspect which was basic to Chief Justice Hughes' reasoning
in The Thomas Barum.0  Investors would not be likely to know or to
assess such restrictions as the owner may place by unrecorded contractual
arrangements upon his vessel, and the mortgage documents would offer
no clue.lcO
VI. THE INVESTORS' GUIDE
A. The Test of Time
What appraisal can be made of the security afforded by the American
preferred ship mortgage? What is the comparative risk in this investment
as measured against that in other fields? Has the statute served its pur-
pose and achieved for the Merchant Marine a form of investment on a par
with other sectors of industry?
Empirically, one may note the few amendments to the Ship Mortgage
153. Id. at 627, 1959 Am. Mlar. Cas. at 1413.
199. See note 29 supra.
160. The indexing of The Abaco Queen, supra note 154, for the "hey-system" points out
some of the problems which attorneys face when researching preferred ship mortgage
matters. The Abaco Queen is listed, among other titles, under "estoppel" and "contractl
Such nonmaritime appellations are rare in ship mortgage categories. Apparently, this wa.
possible in The Abaco Queen chiefly because the word "preferred" did not appear before-
"mortgage." Ordinarily, once that happens, a short circqit develops where the most that can
be gleaned from any cross-indexing is "maritime liens." The unspecific description of "ship-
ping," all too frequently, disposes of the reporter's gloss, e.g., The Sk:ipper III (In re
Suttmeier), 112 F. Supp. 196, 1953 Am. Mlar. Cas. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) which also involve&
a preferred ship mortgage, foreclosure, liens (maritime and otherwhe), recording, vendor-
vendee, specific performance, satisfaction, and so forth.
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Act, only one of which was corrective.'' This is an indicia of stability,
and one may suppose, an expression of satisfaction in the trade. The act
has rarely been the subject of pressure for modification, and judicial
criticism has been sparse.'
Some measure of the industry's contentment may be gleaned from
the Liberian Code'63 where the greater part of the American Ship Mort-
gage Act dealing with preferred ship mortages was almost identically
reproduced for the apparent benefit of American investors using foreign
registry under the so-called "flags of convenience" or "runaway ships."
More pragmatically, the financial community has a substantial com-
mitment0 4 to, and foresees an increasing area of financing in, ship mort-
161. Compare 43 Stat. 948 (1925), 46 U.S.C. §§ 1011-14 (1958), with 41 Stat. 1000
(1920), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 921 (1958). For a good account of the confusing history of
these provisions, see Gilmore & Black, Admiralty § 9-54 (1957). 49 Stat. 424 (1935), as
amended, 46 U.S.C. § 922(a) (1958) (Supp. III, 1959-1961) extended coverage of the
act, with exceptions, to vessels under 200 tons to aid fishermen during the depression;
Gilmore & Black, supra § 9-50, at 575. For background of the amendment of June 29, 1954,
68 Stat. 323, 46 U.S.C. § 951 (1958) see The Tradewind, 153 F. Supp. 354, 1957 Am. Mar.
Cas. 2196 (D. Md. 1957). The most recent amendment is 75 Stat. 661 (1961), 46 U.S.C.
§§ 922, 1161 (Supp. III, 1959-1961) revising the 200 ton minimum to twenty-five tons,
except in so far as Title XI insurance offered by the Government is concerned. See 1961
Am. Mar. Cas. 2493. The insurance provisions of Title XI represent an extension of the
mortgage. 52 Stat. 969 (1938), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 1271(a) (1958) (Supp. III, 1959-
1961). See notes 166-72 & 175 infra and accompanying text.
162. The documentation and home port provisions of the Ship Mortgage Act were
mildly criticized by Judge Inch in The Underwriter, 3 F.2d 483, 1925 Am. Mar. Cas. 803
(E.D.N.Y. 1925). One nonjudicial criticism indicated a need for protecting construction
financing. See Note, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1516, 1521 (1958); see also Rodgers, supra note 147.
An American oil company which has invested heavily in a new tanker presently being built
in Germany is reported as being subordinated to creditors of the bankrupt shipyard. N.Y.
Times, Sept. 14, 1962, p. 62, cols. 6-7.
163. The Liberian Maritime Law ch. 3, §§ 100-13, 2 Liberian Code of Laws 809 (1956)
(ch. 3 also includes lien law, §§ 114-15). The provisions appear in different order than In
the United States statute. The statute was predominately owner and finance-oriented. The
meticulous transposition of the American mortgage and cargo statutes into Liberian law
contrasts sharply to provisions dealing with seamen. The entire Liberian Act for seamen
consists of four brief paragraphs vaguely suggesting that ships should sail with proper
officers and crew, and a brief indication that there should be shipping articles covering
seamen.
164. Comprehensive statistics such as compiled by institutional investors for real mort-
gages are not available for preferred ship mortgages. The Title XI insurance program
furnishes some indication of current activity, although it probably represents but a fraction
of investments in preferred ship mortgages at the present time. The Department of Commerce
reported 358 government-held mortgages amounting to $150 million as of May 31, 1961,
of which possibly only one mortgage (amounting to less than $2 2 million) was given
in the last one and a half years. However, the Department held insurance on mortgages
covering forty vessels with a balance of $282 million of which twenty-four vessels, or over
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gages.1"5 The investment of others is a gauge of sorts. It indicates not
only the considered judgment of informed investors noted for probity, but
adds the practical reassurance of the presence of a market in the main-
tenance of values in this type of security.
For a significant part of the outstanding ship mortgage debt, insurance
under Title XI of the Merchant Marine Act of 19361" has virtually
removed any risk factor. This insurance is available to qualifying mort-
gagors and mortgagees for government approved ship construction pro-
grams. In regard to private investors with such government guaranties,
most of the discussion in this article becomes in large measure
$223 million were covered during the past one and a half years. Letter From Elmer E.
Metz, Chief, Office of Government Aid, Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration,
to Mr. Richard Gyory, June 26, 1961. Further reflecting the rapid expansion of the program
was the Administration's announcement that $463 million on over sixty vessels were either
insured or committed to be insured as of June 30, 1961, with an additional $127 million
pending (for over 100 ships). Maritime Administration Press Release, No. 61-64, July 23, 1961.
However, as of June 30, 1962, the figure was $455,S03,935 according to Donald AV. Alex-
ander, Maritime Administrator. N.Y. Times, July 29, 1962, § 5, p. 165, col. 6. On a smaller
scale, the Department of the Interior, through the Fish and Wild Life Service, Bureau of
Commercial Fisheries, is active in loans secured by mortgages on fishing ves-sels, issuing just
under 200 for the year and a half ending June 30, 1961. The program has been in progr__3
since late 1956, with a total of 440 loans at 5, interest up to June 30, 1961, totaling
$10,125,000 of which $3,000,000 have been repaid. Letter From C. E. Peterson, Chief, Branch
of Loans and Grants, Department of Interior, Fish and Wild Life Service, Bureau of Com-
mercial Fisheries, to Mr. Richard Gyory, July 13, 1961. The Small Business Administration
also issues some loans secured by ship mortgages.
165. See Report, Shields & Co., Financing the U.S. Merchant Marine, May 1953, p. 2,
which foresaw a $1 billion investment to be raised from private sources and guaranteed
under the Title XI program of the federal government. In June 1957, contracts were in
effect to replace, between 1956 and 1957, 175 ships of subsidized operators at an estimated
cost of $1.9 billion, of which subsidies would account for 45 to 50,. Id. at 5, S-9. Guaranteed
mortgages were estimated as running to $-4 billion, which vas referred to as "a major
new source of high-grade investment." Id. at 5. By the end of June 1957, negotiations were
under way for the replacement of an additional figure, 103 vessels, at an estimated $1.1
billion, not including other arrangements for nonsubsidized ship construction. Id. at 9. Be-
ginning in 1954, Grace Lines ($21 million) and Moore-McCormack ($24 million) initiated
public offerings of their preferred ship mortgage bonds through underwriters. Id. at 20-21.
The most recent offering is American Export Lines on four new ships for $13 million, listing
sixteen underwriters. Circular, First Boston Corp., Childs Securities Corp., June 12, 1961.
166. 52 Stat. 969 (1938), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1271-S0 (1953) (Supp. III, 1959-
1961). The Government, in turn, has, in effect, re-insured some of its own risk on non-
subsidized vessels with commercial underwriters. N.Y. Times, April 5, 1961, § 2, p. 73, col. 8;
N.Y. Herald Tribune, April 5, 1961, § 2, p. 33, col. 1. Thomas E. Stakem, then Maritime!
Administrator, in making the announcement, observed the mortgagee would obtain new
types of protection against the mortgagors failure or neglect with respect to physical aspects
of the property and that it gave protection against later liens that would outrank the
mortgage.
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academic.167 Of course, the dislocation of investment by foreshortened
investment periods is a risk consideration. Unexpected returns of capital
bring with them the need to re-invest, perhaps on short notice and un-
favorable terms, with attendant additional expenses. These are, if lesser
problems than outright loss, risks which insurance does not cover.
The cost of the Title XI coverage is comparable to the Government's
charges in guaranteed real estate mortgages. 18 However, no secondary
market has been created for maritime mortgages, 0 9 thereby leaving them
in a less liquid condition than their dry-land counterparts. This indicates
a greater interest on the part of the institutional, rather than the in-
dividual, investor. 70 The insured mortgage is limited to government-
related programs for building and replacement. 17 Its scope will vary with
administration policy, but there is no present indication that it will be
generally available in the industry. 72 Hence, the considerations of this
article will continue to have practical as well as theoretic interest to most
ship mortgagees."'
167. 70 Stat. 1087 (1956), 46 U.S.C. § 1273(d) (1958) states: "The faith of the United
States is solemnly pledged to the payment of interest on and the unpaid balance of the
principal amount of each mortgage and loan insured under this subchapter." The foreclosure
procedure under Title XI is more favorable to the mortgagee than is usually the case In
the Federal Housing Administration programs where the mortgagee ordinarily must first go
through foreclosure proceedings. Under Title XI the mortgagee may demand payment by
the Secretary of Commerce after establishing default. 52 Stat. 971 (1938), as amended,
46 U.S.C. § 1275(a)(1) (1958).
168, Premiums are payable with the first advance and annually thereafter. 52 Stat. 970
(1938), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 1274(d) (1958) (Supp. III, 1959-1961). The mortgagee
receives the premium amounts from the mortgagor at least sixty days in advance of the
due date. 68 Stat. 1270 (1954), 46 U.S.C. § 1274(a) (9) (1958). Premiums run from
%% to 1% annually of the outstanding balance. 52 Stat. 970 (1938), as amended, 46 U.S.C.
§ 1274(d) (1958) (Supp. I1, 1959-1961). Application charges are not to aggregate over
%%. 52 Stat. 970 (1938), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 1274(e) (1958) (Supp. III, 1959-
1961).
169. The Government, through its "Fanny May" operation, allows a secondary market
in Federal Housing Administration and in Veterans Administration mortgages, but for two-
thirds of the outstanding home realty mortgages, i.e., the "conventionals," no such market
exists, although it is currently the subject of discussion in the real estate and housing
field. See N.Y. Times, June 25, 1961, § 1, p. 38, col. 1.
170. Formal legal opinions for underwriters have held Title XI guaranteed bonds to
be legal investment for most banks, insurance companies and fiduciaries in the United
States. See, e.g., Circular, note 165 supra.
171. 52 Stat. 970 (1938), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 1274 (1958) (Supp. III, 1959-1961)
sets forth' eligibility requirements.
172. 68 Stat. 1269 (1954), 46 U.S.C. § 1273(e) (1958) limits the amount insured
at any one time to a maximum of $1 billion.
173. A brief canvass by the writer of marine insurance offices in New York City dis-
dosed no current or recent practice of insuring ship mortgages for the mortgagees outside
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Both commercial and savings banks have been active in preferred ship
mortgages, including foreign17-4 as well as American. The former have
probably brought a slightly higher return, running nevertheless at or
under six per cent. Individual investors, by comparison, have frequently
received in excess of twenty per cent, but they have also had their prob-
lems. This is completely lawful, for the act expressly provides that there
is no limit on the interest to be charged," ' although it frequently comes as
a surprise to those in jurisdictions where usury laws provide various
ceilings.17 6
Probably most reassuring to the potential investor in public offerings
is the small amount of litigation affecting vessels, especially with respect
to the large operators. The major shipping companies have a substantial
debt structure, much of which is secured by preferred ship mortgages. 1"
Notwithstanding these long standing, long term obligations, the law books
are singularly devoid of extensive litigation involving the major com-
the new government program, although one person recalled it had existed, to a small extent,
before the 1929 Depression. An instance of it by way of a surety bond is found in The
Mlonhegan, 33 F.2d 674, 1930 Am. Miar. Cas. 419 (D. Mlass. 1930). Occasionally, a guaranty
may be available from an interested party. See, e.g., The Dolomite No. 2 (In re Rocheter
Shipbuilding Corp.), 32 F. Supp. 98, 1940 Am. Mar. Cas. 97S (W.D.N.Y. 1940).
174. E.g., American investments under foreign flag. In the tank ship category, it was
estimated in 1960 that two-thirds of the United States' privately controlled v.zels were
registered under foreign flags. Sun Oil Co., Analysis of World Tank Ship Fleet, December 31,
1960, p. 17 (Aug. 1961) ; this was true of 1961 also. Sun Oil Co., Analysis of World Tank Ship
Fleet, December 31, 1961, p. 19 (Aug. 1962).
175. 41 Stat. 1002 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 926(d) (195S).
176. 6 Williton, Contracts § 1632 (1933) notes that where no statutory limit is supplied,
equity might nevertheless refuse to enforce an excessive rate. However, the affirmative
language of 41 Stat. 1002 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 926 (1953) appears to explicitly negate !uch
a holding for a preferred ship mortgage. But suppose it is used to camouflage a questionable
loan, e.g., a $100,000 loan at 40% interest with a preferred ship mortgage on a yacht worth
$25,000. Title X[ provisions limit the rate on insured obligations to 5% (and 6% in
special circumstances), 52 Stat. 970 (1938), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 1274(a)(5) (19.3).
Note, however, the usury laws generally exempt corporate oblig.es and their sureties from
their protection. 6 Villiston, supra, § 16,3, at 4759-61, § 1632A, at 4756-57.
177. The largest American operator, United States Lines, has an outstanding balance of
just under $43 million in 3251% preferred mortgage notes against a net value in ship.; of
$70 million. American President Lines has $45 million ($14 million of which are government
insured at 5%) with a total value in ships of less than $59 million. Pacific Far East Lines
has close to $35 million ($23 million held by the Government the remainder ir-urcd) against
a net value in ships of only slightly more than the outstanding mortgages; American Export
Lines has close to $37 million in ship mortgages, about $22.05 million government inmured,
out of a total debt structure, both current and long term, of less than $45 million. Moore-
McCormack Lines is listed at $101 million in ship mortgage debt, $3i million in other
forms. Mloody's Transportation Manual, 1390-1414 (1961).
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panies.178 Few large vessels were the subject of foreclosure at any point
up to the last few years.
The early litigational history reflected the economic crises of the early
1920's and the 1930's. Following the 1937 recession, a small number of
cases appeared. Thereafter, the reported opinions gradually disappeared.
Only a few cases appeared during World War II. A slow trickle of re-
ported opinions started after the war, increasing during the last decade
reaching a peak in 1961. However, the current increase in reported opin-
ions is largely attributable to a few operators whose fleets, assembled for
the most part following the Suez crisis, were probably overcapitalized at
inflated values, and as such, unduly susceptible to slight variations in
economic conditions in the trade. Fixed by a heavy and unresponsive
debt and having a comparatively small equity, the operators were not
representative of the greater part of the Merchant Marine in which they
performed but a small and fairly specialized function. The speculative
nature of their investment sets off the recent wave of cases as a special
situation, not necessarily indicative of the usual security afforded by the
preferred ship mortgage. Whatever else the problems of the industry
may be, the general absence of litigation in the major areas of financing
is one measure of the success of the Ship Mortgage Act in achieving
a stable investment.
Aside from the special factors with which this article has dealt, the
ship mortgage litigation has not been notably different from real estate
and chattel mortgage litigation. There is a continuous stream of reported
general mortgage litigation, which indicates that neither the antiquity of
the concept nor the meticulous nature of the statutes of the many states
dealing with both real and chattel mortgages is a guarantee of litigational
safety. Either directly or tangentially, mortgage matters in toto account
for a substantial, if not the largest part, of reported real estate disputes. 170
Yet, the pace of issuance and renewal of this type of debt appears to be
in no way inhibited by the legal risks, but rather directly controlled by
economic conditions and market values. The investor in mortgages is
likely to encounter comparable situations in either maritime or land-based
178. The Munson Line bankruptcy and related proceedings provided the only significant
exception to the statement. See notes 52 & 70 supra.
179. Title Guarantee Company of New York culls real property and related matters
from the New York Law Journal and issues a bimonthly summary. Out of some thirty
categories listed, those under "mortgage," and its subdivisions, led in the number of cases
for the first four installments of 1961. Mortgage questions were present in several matters
listed for other points. 25 Summary of Recent Decisions, Law of Real Property, Title Guar.
& Trust Co., Nos. 1-4.
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ventures.""0 Such differences as may exist appear to be of small degree,
easily discountable in the projected interest rate.
B. Alternates
An indicator of the mortgage's adequacy as a security device is the
use of alternative measures for the lender's protection. These have greatly
expanded in use and variation in the business world, especially in real
estate during the past decade, although other factors, principally taxes,'
have played a considerable role in some of these developments. The
extra-mortgage solutions which are designed to answer the need for
security in the maritime field do not vary greatly from those in other
areas, but in practice are less used.
The popular sale-and-lease-back has its counterpart in shipping. The
investor takes title to the vessel, then by "bare-boat" or "demise" charter
returns it to the "operator.' t2 The operator employs the vessel under
its "flag," using a name identifying it with the operator, and exercises
complete control. The virtue to the operator is free use of the vessel
without tying up its capital. The lender has title to the vessel and need
not fear the frustration experienced by mortgagees when the mortgagor
or other creditors seek the protection of bankruptcy or other courts to
avoid foreclosure. Various agreements together with insurance go a long
way to minimize the owner's risk. The risks vary in quality from petty
lien libels to disasters. Not all such situations can be satisfactorily in-
sured. The owner must depend largely on the integrity, fiscal and other-
180. Cf. Sherman, "Peculiarities and Conflicts in Various State Laws Affecting Purchase
of 'Mortgages by Investors," 21 Mortgage Banker (No. 11) IS (Aug. 1961). "There are many
peculiarities and conflicts in the laws of certain states with concomitant expenes, risks or
uncertainties." The article notes the disproportionately high cost of foreclosing in various
states due to legal fees and costs, as well as unduly lengthy proceedings, especially, where
long redemption periods favor the mortgagor. There is no "equity of redemption," nor any
right to redeem under the Ship Mortgage Act.
IS1. Of course, income taxes will be of consequence to the shipping field and the mort-
gagee, especially if there is a possibility of taking possession or foreclosure, where the tax
effect may vary. Any arrangement between the parties need not preclude the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, which may hold a loan converted to ownership, John Wanamaker v.
Commissioner, 139 F.2d 644 (3d Cir. 1943), or that an "oowner or lessor" is in truth a
mortgagee, Hilpert v. Commissioner, 151 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1945), possibly disrupting the
plans of the participants and causing important changes in result. For example, will
depredation be denied the "owner," changing the projected income? See note 183 infra.
The public aspects will involve the Securities and Exchange Act, particularly the Trust
Indenture Act which applies to public offerings. However, where a federal administrative
agency is involved, e.g., Title a insured loans, exemptions are available.
132. Statistics and some details for tankers are supplied in Sun Oil Co., Analynis of
World Tank Ship Fleet, December 31, 1960, pp. 2-3, 15-17 (Aug. 1961); Sun Oil Co,
Analysis of World Tank Ship Fleet, December 31, 1961, p. 2, 1.5-17 (Aug. 1962).
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wise, of the operator to protect the vessel from both physical and legal
hazards. Only the large lines or large industrial users of raw materials
who maintain substantial fleets are in such a position. The small operators
are not likely to afford sufficient assurance or stability to creditors to
justify the creditors taking on the risks of ownership. Nor is it likely
that many of the smaller operators would be willing to part with owner-
ship. To them the vessel under current market conditions probably
represents a speculative venture in which the limited equity of the so-
called small operator gives considerable leverage. In these circumstances
mortgage credit is a far more desirable way to raise money from the
small operator's point of view.183
Pledges of corporate stock may reinforce the liened property, adding
the possibility of direct control over the debtor. Whether this is a sub-
stantial improvement in safeguarding a loan may depend upon the degree
to which the corporate debtor has deteriorated. At the point of permissible
action under a stock-transfer arrangement, the additional rights may be
illusory. In practice, the ship will very likely be the only asset where
the small operator is concerned. Control of the corporation could con-
ceivably lead the active creditor into realms of responsibility he would do
better to avoid. 18 4 But it may be a useful additional threat in the creditor's
hands, if it can be obtained.
The lender may make arrangements to assure the application of income
to interest and debt retirement and to assignments of charter hire. 8 It is
183. However, a sale-and-lease-back may be deemed a mortgage for tax purposes.
Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252 (1939). If the holding were extended
beyond this purpose, the ship mortgagee might be in difficulty in not having preferred
status. In The Josephine Lanasa (Findley v. Herd), 250 F.2d 77, 1958 Am. Mar. Cas. 317
(5th Cir. 1958), the security title holder was subordinated to later supply liens.
184. There is no reason to believe the mortgagee in possession would be immune to the
risks of an operator pro hac vice, i.e., as an owner. Thus, he would probably be subordinated
to later lien claims and, if the ship operates, to wage and penalty claims. In The Challenger,
227 F.2d 918, 1956 Am. Mar. Cas. 111 (5th Cir. 1956), Judge Brown held the operator not
entrusted with management under 41 Stat. 1005 (1920), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 972 (1958).
He disallowed claims based on preservation of the res and held the mortgagee had waived
rights to foreclosure. In the Moon Eng'r Co. v. The Valiant Power, 193 F. Supp. 460, 1961
Am. Mar. Cas. 226 (ED. Va. 1960), insurance premiums paid by the mortgagee and not
approved by the court were denied as charges against the fund. More recently in the un-
reported matter of The Wang Hunter, Adm. 1815, D.R.I., Sept. 6, 1961 the Commissioner
held the mortgagees who advanced funds pursuant to certificates of indebtedness Issued
under bankruptcy referee's Chapter XI order at fault for permitting a voyage where ability
to pay the crew was dubious. See note 53 supra. He preferred the seamen to the mortgagees
to the extent of actual travel expenses and subsistence. However, he did not hold the mort-
gagee liable for penalty wages.
185. See In re Atlantic, Gulf & Pac. S.S. Co., 289 Fed. 145, 151-56, 1923 Am. Mar. Cas.
566 (D. Md. 1923), referred to again but in another context at later stage of same pro-
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possible to take charters and grant subcharters. But, as in any business,
arrangements for income as well as use of the property decline in benefits
as the slack in the industry extends.
While the suggested schemes offer a degree of additional flexibility and
some extra safeguards, they clearly do not suggest effective alternatives
to replace the use of the ship mortgage. On the contrary, the preferred
ship mortgage will be the basic part of the security for a loan to ship
operators and owners.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Preferred Ship Mortgage Act of 1920 did not solve the basic eco-
nomic problems of the American lerchant Marine. These have to do
with a high national price structure in conflict with a low international
price structure, with economic and military needs and with adjustments and
accommodations, political and otherwise. But the act has supplied the
industry with a viable, indeed a necessary legal form, without which its
present existence could not continue in the absence of drastic changes
that would be needed to replace the ship mortgage. A major part of
the capital in the maritime industry depends on preferred ship mortgages,
and they form an accepted part of the financial securities available to the
public. The investor may have a somewhat different type of risk with
possibly a slightly greater litigation factor. But four decades of lawbook
history indicate no substantial variance between this and the more familiar
type of real estate or chattel mortgage.
Very likely the greater number of disputes and problems in maritime
mortgages, as elsewhere, does not reach the reporter system; possibly not
even the courts. The chief virtue of legal framework ordinarily is that
it provides a reference which enables parties to work out problems with-
out going to court. Foreclosure procedure under the act may result in
more lengthy litigation-than in other types of mortgages in many jurisdic-
tions. But ultimately the mortgagee's real power, whether at sea or ashore,
lies more in the psychological factor of potential foreclosure than in the
ceeding 3 F.2d 309, 311-12, 1924 Am. Mlar. Cas. 131 (D. Md. 1923), aff'd, 3 F.Zd 433 (4th
Cir. 1925). For earlier authority see Merchants' Banking Co. v. Cargo of The Afton, 134 Fed.
727 (2d Cir. 1904), reversing 125 Fed. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1903). In The Dolomite No. 2 (In re
Rochester Shipbuilding Corp.), 32 F. Supp. 9S, 1940 Am. Mlar. Cas. 973 (W.D.N.Y. 1940),
a'request by the mortgagee to continue a charter, the mortgagee bcing entitled to the hire
money, was denied. The charterer there had guaranteed the mortgage payments. A guaranty
may be pursued under ordinary common-law principle , outside admiralty. Wall St. Traders,
Inc. v. Wang, 1961 Am. lar. Cas. 936 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 13 App. D!,. 2d 767,
217 N .. S.2d 501, 1961 Am. Mar. Cas. 2214 (1st Dep't 1961). Several practical suggeztions
for coupling assignments and loans are made in Rodgers, Ship Construction Financing, 12
Bus. Law. 142 (1957).
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actuality of its use. So long as the mortgagor operates, he must show, of
record, his obligation to the mortgagee. This affects his operation and
his all-important ability, if any, to generate further credit. He must per-
form his covenants, always with the knowledge that default can lead to
loss of his major asset, the ship. As the psychological factor is reduced,
the mortgagee's power is reduced. With the disappearance of equity, the
mortgagor's risk evaporates, leaving his creditor to grapple with other
lienors.
The preferred ship mortgagee must, as in any venture, direct his
questions as to the safety or risk of his loan to the economic outlook, to
the appraised value of the security and to the margin of equity remaining
against the possibility of forced sale. This is, after all, the same question
any mortgagee must ask.
